Wire up the userspace networking primitives to the JS bridge so
browser callers can initiate outbound and receive inbound traffic
over the Tailscale network:
- ipn.dial(network, addr) wraps a tsdial UserDial into a JS Conn
with read/write/close/localAddr/remoteAddr.
- ipn.listen(network, addr) wraps a netstack ListenPacket into a
JS PacketConn with readFrom/writeTo/close/localAddr.
- ipn.listenICMP("icmp4"|"icmp6"|"icmp") creates a raw ICMP
endpoint on the underlying gVisor stack and wraps it as a
PacketConn for sending/receiving ping traffic.
To support listenICMP, netstack.Impl gains a Stack() accessor that
returns the underlying *stack.Stack so jsIPN can call NewEndpoint
with icmp.ProtocolNumber4/6.
Binary I/O uses js.CopyBytesToGo / js.CopyBytesToJS to move bytes
across the syscall/js boundary without base64 round-trips.
Upstream's featuretags work turned the wasm build into an allow-list scoped
to its SSH-in-browser client, which strips most of what this fork's JS bridge
exposes. Two problems, both silent at build time:
- cmd/tsconnect/wasm never imported feature/condregister, so extensions only
registered if the wasm happened to import them directly (taildrop did, ACME
did not). Without it getCert/listenTLS/setFunnel fail with "cert support not
compiled in this build".
- The Keep allow-list omitted acme, serve, taildrop, drive, tailnetlock,
bakedroots and the exit node features. bakedroots matters especially: a
browser has no system roots, so net/tlsdial's LetsEncrypt fallback is the
only verification path there.
Invert the polarity to an explicit Omit list, matching how this build behaved
before featuretags existed. Only feature/ace is omitted, because it does not
compile for GOOS=js. Trimming the bundle is worth doing later with
measurements; an allow-list turns each mistake into a runtime failure rather
than a build error.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
codinget
