Introduce a per-tailnet shared ACME account key so that all ingress
ProxyGroup replicas on a tailnet present the same account identity to
Let's Encrypt. This lets renewals claim the ARI "replaces" exemption
from the 50-certs-per-week rate limit, surviving Pod restarts,
ProxyGroup recreation, and cluster migrations.
The operator provisions a "tailscale-acme-accounts" Secret in its
namespace, guarded by a finalizer and a deletion warning event, and
watched so it is recreated promptly if removed. Proxies migrate any
pre-existing per-pod key into the shared Secret on first boot, adopt
the shared key on subsequent boots, and restore it on cert writes if
the Secret was recreated empty. Certs are stamped with the fingerprint
of the issuing account so renewals skip the "replaces" claim when the
account doesn't match.
Opt-in per-ProxyGroup via the tailscale.com/share-acme-account
annotation, or operator-wide via OPERATOR_SHARED_ACME_ACCOUNT_KEY.
Updates #18251
Updates #20288
Signed-off-by: chaosinthecrd <tom@tmlabs.co.uk>
All StateStore implementations store a nil value in the cache map when WriteState is called with a nil byte slice instead of deleting the key. This causes ReadState to return (nil, nil) instead of (nil, ErrStateNotExist), since the key is still present in the map.
This breaks reset-auth in Windows, Linux, and Android, and the node can't log back in without manually editing the state file. (macOS uses a different state store)
DeleteProfile, DeleteAllProfilesForUser, setUnattendedModeAsConfigured are impacted but don't seem to break because the deleted keys are not reread.
This deletes the key from the cache instead.
Fixestailscale/corp#42477
Signed-off-by: kari-ts <kari@tailscale.com>
This file was never truly necessary and has never actually been used in
the history of Tailscale's open source releases.
A Brief History of AUTHORS files
---
The AUTHORS file was a pattern developed at Google, originally for
Chromium, then adopted by Go and a bunch of other projects. The problem
was that Chromium originally had a copyright line only recognizing
Google as the copyright holder. Because Google (and most open source
projects) do not require copyright assignemnt for contributions, each
contributor maintains their copyright. Some large corporate contributors
then tried to add their own name to the copyright line in the LICENSE
file or in file headers. This quickly becomes unwieldy, and puts a
tremendous burden on anyone building on top of Chromium, since the
license requires that they keep all copyright lines intact.
The compromise was to create an AUTHORS file that would list all of the
copyright holders. The LICENSE file and source file headers would then
include that list by reference, listing the copyright holder as "The
Chromium Authors".
This also become cumbersome to simply keep the file up to date with a
high rate of new contributors. Plus it's not always obvious who the
copyright holder is. Sometimes it is the individual making the
contribution, but many times it may be their employer. There is no way
for the proejct maintainer to know.
Eventually, Google changed their policy to no longer recommend trying to
keep the AUTHORS file up to date proactively, and instead to only add to
it when requested: https://opensource.google/docs/releasing/authors.
They are also clear that:
> Adding contributors to the AUTHORS file is entirely within the
> project's discretion and has no implications for copyright ownership.
It was primarily added to appease a small number of large contributors
that insisted that they be recognized as copyright holders (which was
entirely their right to do). But it's not truly necessary, and not even
the most accurate way of identifying contributors and/or copyright
holders.
In practice, we've never added anyone to our AUTHORS file. It only lists
Tailscale, so it's not really serving any purpose. It also causes
confusion because Tailscalars put the "Tailscale Inc & AUTHORS" header
in other open source repos which don't actually have an AUTHORS file, so
it's ambiguous what that means.
Instead, we just acknowledge that the contributors to Tailscale (whoever
they are) are copyright holders for their individual contributions. We
also have the benefit of using the DCO (developercertificate.org) which
provides some additional certification of their right to make the
contribution.
The source file changes were purely mechanical with:
git ls-files | xargs sed -i -e 's/\(Tailscale Inc &\) AUTHORS/\1 contributors/g'
Updates #cleanup
Change-Id: Ia101a4a3005adb9118051b3416f5a64a4a45987d
Signed-off-by: Will Norris <will@tailscale.com>
Fixes a bug where, for kube HA proxies, TLS certs for the replica
responsible for cert issuance where loaded in memory on startup,
although the in-memory store was not updated after renewal (to
avoid failing re-issuance for re-created Ingresses).
Now the 'write' replica always reads certs from the kube Secret.
Updates tailscale/tailscale#18394
Signed-off-by: Irbe Krumina <irbekrm@gmail.com>
Ensure that hardware attestation keys are not added to tailscaled
state stores that are Kubernetes Secrets or AWS SSM as those Tailscale
devices should be able to be recreated on different nodes, for example,
when moving Pods between nodes.
Updates tailscale/tailscale#18302
Signed-off-by: Irbe Krumina <irbekrm@gmail.com>
Also adds a test to kube/kubeclient to defend against the error type
returned by the client changing in future.
Fixestailscale/corp#30855
Change-Id: Id11d4295003e66ad5c29a687f1239333c21226a4
Signed-off-by: Tom Proctor <tomhjp@users.noreply.github.com>
Adds a new reconciler for ProxyGroups of type kube-apiserver that will
provision a Tailscale Service for each replica to advertise. Adds two
new condition types to the ProxyGroup, TailscaleServiceValid and
TailscaleServiceConfigured, to post updates on the state of that
reconciler in a way that's consistent with the service-pg reconciler.
The created Tailscale Service name is configurable via a new ProxyGroup
field spec.kubeAPISserver.ServiceName, which expects a string of the
form "svc:<dns-label>".
Lots of supporting changes were needed to implement this in a way that's
consistent with other operator workflows, including:
* Pulled containerboot's ensureServicesUnadvertised and certManager into
kube/ libraries to be shared with k8s-proxy. Use those in k8s-proxy to
aid Service cert sharing between replicas and graceful Service shutdown.
* For certManager, add an initial wait to the cert loop to wait until
the domain appears in the devices's netmap to avoid a guaranteed error
on the first issue attempt when it's quick to start.
* Made several methods in ingress-for-pg.go and svc-for-pg.go into
functions to share with the new reconciler
* Added a Resource struct to the owner refs stored in Tailscale Service
annotations to be able to distinguish between Ingress- and ProxyGroup-
based Services that need cleaning up in the Tailscale API.
* Added a ListVIPServices method to the internal tailscale client to aid
cleaning up orphaned Services
* Support for reading config from a kube Secret, and partial support for
config reloading, to prevent us having to force Pod restarts when
config changes.
* Fixed up the zap logger so it's possible to set debug log level.
Updates #13358
Change-Id: Ia9607441157dd91fb9b6ecbc318eecbef446e116
Signed-off-by: Tom Proctor <tomhjp@users.noreply.github.com>
ipn/store/kubestore: skip cache for the write replica in cert share mode
This is to avoid issues where stale cache after Ingress recreation
causes the certs not to be re-issued.
Updates tailscale/corp#24795
Signed-off-by: Irbe Krumina <irbe@tailscale.com>
This PR adds some custom logic for reading and writing
kube store values that are TLS certs and keys:
1) when store is initialized, lookup additional
TLS Secrets for this node and if found, load TLS certs
from there
2) if the node runs in certs 'read only' mode and
TLS cert and key are not found in the in-memory store,
look those up in a Secret
3) if the node runs in certs 'read only' mode, run
a daily TLS certs reload to memory to get any
renewed certs
Updates tailscale/corp#24795
Signed-off-by: Irbe Krumina <irbe@tailscale.com>
Reads use the sanitized form, so unsanitized keys being stored
in memory resulted lookup failures, for example for serve config.
Updates tailscale/tailscale#15134
Signed-off-by: Irbe Krumina <irbe@tailscale.com>
chaosinthecrd
kari-ts
Will Norris
Irbe Krumina
Tom Proctor