The actual secret is passed through argon2 first, so a timing attack is
not feasible remotely, and pretty unlikely locally. Still, clean this
up.
Fixes#19063
Signed-off-by: Andrew Lytvynov <awly@tailscale.com>
I omitted a lot of the min/max modernizers because they didn't
result in more clear code.
Some of it's older "for x := range 123".
Also: errors.AsType, any, fmt.Appendf, etc.
Updates #18682
Change-Id: I83a451577f33877f962766a5b65ce86f7696471c
Signed-off-by: Brad Fitzpatrick <bradfitz@tailscale.com>
Fix its/it's, who's/whose, wether/whether, missing apostrophes
in contractions, and other misspellings across the codebase.
Updates #cleanup
Change-Id: I20453b81a7aceaa14ea2a551abba08a2e7f0a1d8
Signed-off-by: Brad Fitzpatrick <bradfitz@tailscale.com>
This file was never truly necessary and has never actually been used in
the history of Tailscale's open source releases.
A Brief History of AUTHORS files
---
The AUTHORS file was a pattern developed at Google, originally for
Chromium, then adopted by Go and a bunch of other projects. The problem
was that Chromium originally had a copyright line only recognizing
Google as the copyright holder. Because Google (and most open source
projects) do not require copyright assignemnt for contributions, each
contributor maintains their copyright. Some large corporate contributors
then tried to add their own name to the copyright line in the LICENSE
file or in file headers. This quickly becomes unwieldy, and puts a
tremendous burden on anyone building on top of Chromium, since the
license requires that they keep all copyright lines intact.
The compromise was to create an AUTHORS file that would list all of the
copyright holders. The LICENSE file and source file headers would then
include that list by reference, listing the copyright holder as "The
Chromium Authors".
This also become cumbersome to simply keep the file up to date with a
high rate of new contributors. Plus it's not always obvious who the
copyright holder is. Sometimes it is the individual making the
contribution, but many times it may be their employer. There is no way
for the proejct maintainer to know.
Eventually, Google changed their policy to no longer recommend trying to
keep the AUTHORS file up to date proactively, and instead to only add to
it when requested: https://opensource.google/docs/releasing/authors.
They are also clear that:
> Adding contributors to the AUTHORS file is entirely within the
> project's discretion and has no implications for copyright ownership.
It was primarily added to appease a small number of large contributors
that insisted that they be recognized as copyright holders (which was
entirely their right to do). But it's not truly necessary, and not even
the most accurate way of identifying contributors and/or copyright
holders.
In practice, we've never added anyone to our AUTHORS file. It only lists
Tailscale, so it's not really serving any purpose. It also causes
confusion because Tailscalars put the "Tailscale Inc & AUTHORS" header
in other open source repos which don't actually have an AUTHORS file, so
it's ambiguous what that means.
Instead, we just acknowledge that the contributors to Tailscale (whoever
they are) are copyright holders for their individual contributions. We
also have the benefit of using the DCO (developercertificate.org) which
provides some additional certification of their right to make the
contribution.
The source file changes were purely mechanical with:
git ls-files | xargs sed -i -e 's/\(Tailscale Inc &\) AUTHORS/\1 contributors/g'
Updates #cleanup
Change-Id: Ia101a4a3005adb9118051b3416f5a64a4a45987d
Signed-off-by: Will Norris <will@tailscale.com>
This improves our test coverage of the Bootstrap() method, especially
around catching AUMs that shouldn't pass validation.
Updates #cleanup
Change-Id: Idc61fcbc6daaa98c36d20ec61e45ce48771b85de
Signed-off-by: Alex Chan <alexc@tailscale.com>
This patch adds an integration test for Tailnet Lock, checking that a node can't
talk to peers in the tailnet until it becomes signed.
This patch also introduces a new package `tstest/tkatest`, which has some helpers
for constructing a mock control server that responds to TKA requests. This allows
us to reduce boilerplate in the IPN tests.
Updates tailscale/corp#33599
Signed-off-by: Alex Chan <alexc@tailscale.com>
This is causing confusing panics in tailscale/corp#34485. We'll keep
using the tka.ChonkMem constructor as much as we can, but don't panic
if you create a tka.Mem directly -- we know what the sensible thing is.
Updates #cleanup
Signed-off-by: Alex Chan <alexc@tailscale.com>
Change-Id: I49309f5f403fc26ce4f9a6cf0edc8eddf6a6f3a4
Previously a TKA compaction would only run when a node starts, which means a long-running node could use unbounded storage as it accumulates ever-increasing amounts of TKA state. This patch changes TKA so it runs a compaction after every sync.
Updates https://github.com/tailscale/corp/issues/33537
Change-Id: I91df887ea0c5a5b00cb6caced85aeffa2a4b24ee
Signed-off-by: Alex Chan <alexc@tailscale.com>
We use `tka.AUMHash` in `netmap.NetworkMap`, and we serialise it as JSON
in the `/debug/netmap` C2N endpoint. If the binary omits Tailnet Lock support,
the debug endpoint returns an error because it's unable to marshal the
AUMHash.
This patch adds a sentinel value so this marshalling works, and we can
use the debug endpoint.
Updates https://github.com/tailscale/tailscale/issues/17115
Signed-off-by: Alex Chan <alexc@tailscale.com>
Change-Id: I51ec1491a74e9b9f49d1766abd89681049e09ce4
Existing compaction logic seems to have had an assumption that
markActiveChain would cover a longer part of the chain than
markYoungAUMs. This prevented long, but fresh, chains, from being
compacted correctly.
Updates tailscale/corp#33537
Signed-off-by: Anton Tolchanov <anton@tailscale.com>
I added a RemoveAll() method on tka.Chonk in #17946, but it's only used
in the node to purge local AUMs. We don't need it in the SQLite storage,
which currently implements tka.Chonk, so move it to CompactableChonk
instead.
Also add some automated tests, as a safety net.
Updates tailscale/corp#33599
Change-Id: I54de9ccf1d6a3d29b36a94eccb0ebd235acd4ebc
Signed-off-by: Alex Chan <alexc@tailscale.com>
Let's fix all the typos, which lets the code be more readable, lest we
confuse our readers.
Updates #cleanup
Change-Id: I4954601b0592b1fda40269009647bb517a4457be
Signed-off-by: Brad Fitzpatrick <bradfitz@tailscale.com>
This requires making the internals of LocalBackend a bit more generic,
and implementing the `tka.CompactableChonk` interface for `tka.Mem`.
Signed-off-by: Alex Chan <alexc@tailscale.com>
Updates https://github.com/tailscale/corp/issues/33599
This patch changes the behaviour of `tailscale lock log --json` to make
it more useful for users. It also introduces versioning of our JSON output.
## Changes to `tailscale lock log --json`
Previously this command would print the hash and base64-encoded bytes of
each AUM, and users would need their own CBOR decoder to interpret it in
a useful way:
```json
[
{
"Hash": [
80,
136,
151,
…
],
"Change": "checkpoint",
"Raw": "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"
}
]
```
Now we print the AUM in an expanded form that can be easily read by scripts,
although we include the raw bytes for verification and auditing.
```json
{
"SchemaVersion": "1",
"Messages": [
{
"Hash": "KCEJPRKNSXJG2TPH3EHQRLJNLIIK2DV53FUNPADWA7BZJWBDRXZQ",
"AUM": {
"MessageKind": "checkpoint",
"PrevAUMHash": null,
"Key": null,
"KeyID": null,
"State": {
…
},
"Votes": null,
"Meta": null,
"Signatures": [
{
"KeyID": "tlpub:e44874d1ea48ecf3d6dac8ca09cfe70dc958ad83b656393432016c3ed229c8d6",
"Signature": "8yAKKHPpuOWsuTwfzgeAAPRXZIuCiavS5fjxeiCR2JTlYaU23NxNChezg7tVlEXdH+z151u9na/PQknxsSBwBQ=="
}
]
},
"Raw": "pAEFAvYFpQH2AopYIAkPN-8V3cJpkoC5ZY2-RI2Bcg2q5G7tRAQQd67W3YpnWCDPOo4KGeQBd8hdGsjoEQpSXyiPdlm-NXAlJ5dS1qEbFlggylNJDQM5ZQ2ULNsXxg2ZBFkPl_D93I1M56_rowU-UIlYIPZ_SxT9EA2Idy9kaCbsFzjX_s3Ms7584wWGbWd_f_QAWCBHYZzYiAPpQ-NXN-1Wn2fopQYk4yl7kNQcMXUKNAdt1lggcfjcuVACOH0J9pRNvYZQFOkbiBmLOW1hPKJsbC1D1GdYIKrJ38XMgpVMuTuBxM4YwoLmrK_RgXQw1uVEL3cywl3QWCA0FilVVv8uys8BNhS62cfNvCew1Pw5wIgSe3Prv8d8pFggQrwIt6ldYtyFPQcC5V18qrCnt7VpThACaz5RYzpx7RNYIKskOA7UoNiVtMkOrV2QoXv6EvDpbO26a01lVeh8UCeEA4KjAQECAQNYIORIdNHqSOzz1trIygnP5w3JWK2DtlY5NDIBbD7SKcjWowEBAgEDWCD27LpxiZNiA19k0QZhOWmJRvBdK2mz-dHu7rf0iGTPFwQb69Gt42fKNn0FGwRUiav_k6dDF4GiAVgg5Eh00epI7PPW2sjKCc_nDclYrYO2Vjk0MgFsPtIpyNYCWEDzIAooc-m45ay5PB_OB4AA9Fdki4KJq9Ll-PF6IJHYlOVhpTbc3E0KF7ODu1WURd0f7PXnW72dr89CSfGxIHAF"
}
]
}
```
This output was previously marked as unstable, and it wasn't very useful,
so changing it should be fine.
## Versioning our JSON output
This patch introduces a way to version our JSON output on the CLI, so we
can make backwards-incompatible changes in future without breaking existing
scripts or integrations.
You can run this command in two ways:
```
tailscale lock log --json
tailscale lock log --json=1
```
Passing an explicit version number allows you to pick a specific JSON schema.
If we ever want to change the schema, we increment the version number and
users must opt-in to the new output.
A bare `--json` flag will always return schema version 1, for compatibility
with existing scripts.
Updates https://github.com/tailscale/tailscale/issues/17613
Updates https://github.com/tailscale/corp/issues/23258
Signed-off-by: Alex Chan <alexc@tailscale.com>
Change-Id: I897f78521cc1a81651f5476228c0882d7b723606
Previously if `chains` was empty, it would be passed to `computeActiveAncestor()`,
which would fail with the misleading error "multiple distinct chains".
Updates tailscale/corp#33846
Signed-off-by: Alex Chan <alexc@tailscale.com>
Change-Id: Ib93a755dbdf4127f81cbf69f3eece5a388db31c8
* When we do the TKA sync, log whether TKA is enabled and whether
we want it to be enabled. This would help us see if a node is
making bootstrap errors.
* When we fail to look up an AUM locally, log the ID of the AUM
rather than a generic "file does not exist" error.
These AUM IDs are cryptographic hashes of the TKA state, which
itself just contains public keys and signatures. These IDs aren't
sensitive and logging them is safe.
Signed-off-by: Alex Chan <alexc@tailscale.com>
Updates https://github.com/tailscale/corp/issues/33594
This patch creates a set of tests that should be true for all implementations of Chonk and CompactableChonk, which we can share with the SQLite implementation in corp.
It includes all the existing tests, plus a test for LastActiveAncestor which was in corp but not in oss.
Updates https://github.com/tailscale/corp/issues/33465
Signed-off-by: Alex Chan <alexc@tailscale.com>
We soft-delete AUMs when they're purged, but when we call `ChildAUMs()`,
we look up soft-deleted AUMs to find the `Children` field.
This patch changes the behaviour of `ChildAUMs()` so it only looks at
not-deleted AUMs. This means we don't need to record child information
on AUMs any more, which is a minor space saving for any newly-recorded
AUMs.
Updates https://github.com/tailscale/tailscale/issues/17566
Updates https://github.com/tailscale/corp/issues/27166
Signed-off-by: Alex Chan <alexc@tailscale.com>
This method was added in cca25f6 in the initial in-memory implementation
of Chonk, but it's not part of the Chonk interface and isn't implemented
or used anywhere else. Let's get rid of it.
Updates https://github.com/tailscale/corp/issues/33465
Signed-off-by: Alex Chan <alexc@tailscale.com>
I noticed this while modularizing clientupdate. With this in first,
moving clientupdate to be modular removes a bunch more stuff from
the minimal build + tsnet.
Updates #17115
Change-Id: I44bd055fca65808633fd3a848b0bbc09b00ad4fa
Signed-off-by: Brad Fitzpatrick <bradfitz@tailscale.com>
When a rotation signature chain reaches a certain size, remove the
oldest rotation signature from the chain before wrapping it in a new
rotation signature.
Since all previous rotation signatures are signed by the same wrapping
pubkey (node's own tailnet lock key), the node can re-construct the
chain, re-signing previous rotation signatures. This will satisfy the
existing certificate validation logic.
Updates #13185
Signed-off-by: Anton Tolchanov <anton@tailscale.com>
In Tailnet Lock, there is an implicit limit on the number of rotation
signatures that can be chained before the signature becomes too long.
This program helps tailnet admins to identify nodes that have signatures
with long chains and prints commands to re-sign those node keys with a
fresh direct signature. It's a temporary mitigation measure, and we will
remove this tool as we design and implement a long-term approach for
rotation signatures.
Example output:
```
2024/08/20 18:25:03 Self: does not need re-signing
2024/08/20 18:25:03 Visible peers with valid signatures:
2024/08/20 18:25:03 Peer xxx2.yy.ts.net. (100.77.192.34) nodeid=nyDmhiZiGA11KTM59, current signature kind=direct: does not need re-signing
2024/08/20 18:25:03 Peer xxx3.yy.ts.net. (100.84.248.22) nodeid=ndQ64mDnaB11KTM59, current signature kind=direct: does not need re-signing
2024/08/20 18:25:03 Peer xxx4.yy.ts.net. (100.85.253.53) nodeid=nmZfVygzkB21KTM59, current signature kind=rotation: chain length 4, printing command to re-sign
tailscale lock sign nodekey:530bddbfbe69e91fe15758a1d6ead5337aa6307e55ac92dafad3794f8b3fc661 tlpub:4bf07597336703395f2149dce88e7c50dd8694ab5bbde3d7c2a1c7b3e231a3c2
```
To support this, the NetworkLockStatus localapi response now includes
information about signatures of all peers rather than just the invalid
ones. This is not displayed by default in `tailscale lock status`, but
will be surfaced in `tailscale lock status --json`.
Updates #13185
Signed-off-by: Anton Tolchanov <anton@tailscale.com>
Detection of duplicate Network Lock signature chains added in
01847e0123 failed to account for chains
originating with a SigCredential signature, which is used for wrapped
auth keys. This results in erroneous removal of signatures that
originate from the same re-usable auth key.
This change ensures that multiple nodes created by the same re-usable
auth key are not getting filtered out by the network lock.
Updates tailscale/corp#19764
Signed-off-by: Anton Tolchanov <anton@tailscale.com>
This change moves handling of wrapped auth keys to the `tka` package and
adds a test covering auth key originating signatures (SigCredential) in
netmap.
Updates tailscale/corp#19764
Signed-off-by: Anton Tolchanov <anton@tailscale.com>
A non-signing node can be allowed to re-sign its new node keys following
key renewal/rotation (e.g. via `tailscale up --force-reauth`). To be
able to do this, node's TLK is written into WrappingPubkey field of the
initial SigDirect signature, signed by a signing node.
The intended use of this field implies that, for each WrappingPubkey, we
typically expect to have at most one active node with a signature
tracing back to that key. Multiple valid signatures referring to the
same WrappingPubkey can occur if a client's state has been cloned, but
it's something we explicitly discourage and don't support:
https://tailscale.com/s/clone
This change propagates rotation details (wrapping public key, a list
of previous node keys that have been rotated out) to netmap processing,
and adds tracking of obsolete node keys that, when found, will get
filtered out.
Updates tailscale/corp#19764
Signed-off-by: Anton Tolchanov <anton@tailscale.com>
- Add current node signature to `ipnstate.NetworkLockStatus`;
- Print current node signature in a human-friendly format as part
of `tailscale lock status`.
Examples:
```
$ tailscale lock status
Tailnet lock is ENABLED.
This node is accessible under tailnet lock. Node signature:
SigKind: direct
Pubkey: [OTB3a]
KeyID: tlpub:44a0e23cd53a4b8acc02f6732813d8f5ba8b35d02d48bf94c9f1724ebe31c943
WrappingPubkey: tlpub:44a0e23cd53a4b8acc02f6732813d8f5ba8b35d02d48bf94c9f1724ebe31c943
This node's tailnet-lock key: tlpub:44a0e23cd53a4b8acc02f6732813d8f5ba8b35d02d48bf94c9f1724ebe31c943
Trusted signing keys:
tlpub:44a0e23cd53a4b8acc02f6732813d8f5ba8b35d02d48bf94c9f1724ebe31c943 1 (self)
tlpub:6fa21d242a202b290de85926ba3893a6861888679a73bc3a43f49539d67c9764 1 (pre-auth key kq3NzejWoS11KTM59)
```
For a node created via a signed auth key:
```
This node is accessible under tailnet lock. Node signature:
SigKind: rotation
Pubkey: [e3nAO]
Nested:
SigKind: credential
KeyID: tlpub:6fa21d242a202b290de85926ba3893a6861888679a73bc3a43f49539d67c9764
WrappingPubkey: tlpub:3623b0412cab0029cb1918806435709b5947ae03554050f20caf66629f21220a
```
For a node that rotated its key a few times:
```
This node is accessible under tailnet lock. Node signature:
SigKind: rotation
Pubkey: [DOzL4]
Nested:
SigKind: rotation
Pubkey: [S/9yU]
Nested:
SigKind: rotation
Pubkey: [9E9v4]
Nested:
SigKind: direct
Pubkey: [3QHTJ]
KeyID: tlpub:44a0e23cd53a4b8acc02f6732813d8f5ba8b35d02d48bf94c9f1724ebe31c943
WrappingPubkey: tlpub:2faa280025d3aba0884615f710d8c50590b052c01a004c2b4c2c9434702ae9d0
```
Updates tailscale/corp#19764
Signed-off-by: Anton Tolchanov <anton@tailscale.com>
Run `staticcheck` with `U1000` to find unused code. This cleans up about
a half of it. I'll do the other half separately to keep PRs manageable.
Updates #cleanup
Signed-off-by: Andrew Lytvynov <awly@tailscale.com>
I didn't clean up the more idiomatic map[T]bool with true values, at
least yet. I just converted the relatively awkward struct{}-valued
maps.
Updates #cleanup
Change-Id: I758abebd2bb1f64bc7a9d0f25c32298f4679c14f
Signed-off-by: Brad Fitzpatrick <bradfitz@tailscale.com>
This eventually allows encoding packages that may respect
the proposed encoding.TextAppender interface.
The performance gains from this is between 10-30%.
Updates tailscale/corp#14379
Signed-off-by: Joe Tsai <joetsai@digital-static.net>
The revoke-keys command allows nodes with tailnet lock keys
to collaborate to erase the use of a compromised key, and remove trust
in it.
Signed-off-by: Tom DNetto <tom@tailscale.com>
Updates ENG-1848
In late 2022 a subtle but crucial part of documentation was added to ed25519.Verify: It
will panic if len(publicKey) is not [PublicKeySize].
02ed0e5e67
This change catches that error so it won't lead to a panic.
Signed-off-by: Tom DNetto <tom@tailscale.com>
Updates https://github.com/tailscale/corp/issues/8568
This commit continues the work from #8303, providing a method for a
tka.Authority to generate valid deeplinks for signing devices. We'll
use this to provide the necessary deeplinks for users to sign from
their mobile devices.
Updates #8302
Signed-off-by: Ross Zurowski <ross@rosszurowski.com>
* tka: provide verify-deeplink local API endpoint
Fixes https://github.com/tailscale/tailscale/issues/8302
Signed-off-by: Andrea Gottardo <andrea@tailscale.com>
Address code review comments
Signed-off-by: Andrea Gottardo <andrea@tailscale.com>
Address code review comments by Ross
Signed-off-by: Andrea Gottardo <andrea@tailscale.com>
* Improve error encoding, fix logic error
Signed-off-by: Andrea Gottardo <andrea@tailscale.com>
---------
Signed-off-by: Andrea Gottardo <andrea@tailscale.com>
go vet complains when we copy a lock value. Create clone function that
copies everything but the lock value.
Fixes#8207
Signed-off-by: Val <valerie@tailscale.com>
This adds an initial and intentionally minimal configuration for
golang-ci, fixes the issues reported, and adds a GitHub Action to check
new pull requests against this linter configuration.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Dunham <andrew@du.nham.ca>
Change-Id: I8f38fbc315836a19a094d0d3e986758b9313f163
Andrew Lytvynov
Brad Fitzpatrick
Will Norris
Alex Chan
Anton Tolchanov
Joe Tsai
Jenny Zhang
Tom DNetto
Ross Zurowski
Andrea Gottardo
valscale
Andrew Dunham