net/tstun, wgengine/filter: track UDP flow state for injected packets

Outbound packets produced by netstack (used by tailscaled with --tun userspace-networking, by tsnet, and by the SOCKS5/HTTP proxies) enter the wrapper via InjectOutbound{,PacketBuffer} and take the injectedRead path, which bypasses Filter.RunOut. RunOut's side effect for UDP/SCTP is to insert the reverse-flow tuple into the connection-tracking LRU so that Filter.RunIn admits inbound replies that no explicit ACL rule covers. Skipping it on the injected path meant a netstack-side dial of UDP would send fine but the reply would be dropped as "no matching rule". The kernel-TUN path was already fine because it goes through RunOut. Fixes #14229 Fixes #20064 Signed-off-by: Brad Fitzpatrick <bradfitz@tailscale.com> Change-Id: I816ef55c493a12ff4f561cd89c095559b5c2743b
2026-06-22 15:57:37 -07:00
parent 568c0bda24
commit e0677ccc76
4 changed files with 252 additions and 4 deletions
@@ -1101,7 +1101,10 @@ func invertGSOChecksum(pkt []byte, gso netstack_GSO) {
 	pkt[at+1] = ^pkt[at+1]
 }

-// injectedRead handles injected reads, which bypass filters.
+// injectedRead handles injected reads. Injected packets bypass the outbound
+// filter rules, but UDP/SCTP flow state is still recorded via
+// [filter.Filter.UpdateOutboundFlowState] so inbound replies are admitted by
+// [filter.Filter.RunIn].
 func (t *Wrapper) injectedRead(res tunInjectedRead, outBuffs [][]byte, sizes []int, offset int) (n int, err error) {
 	var gso netstack_GSO

@@ -1128,6 +1131,28 @@ func (t *Wrapper) injectedRead(res tunInjectedRead, outBuffs [][]byte, sizes []i
 	defer parsedPacketPool.Put(p)
 	p.Decode(pkt)

+	// Record reverse-flow connection-tracking state for this outbound packet so
+	// that inbound replies are admitted by the filter. Injected packets bypass
+	// the regular RunOut path that records this state for UDP/SCTP flows; doing
+	// it here keeps userspace-networking and tsnet UDP replies from being
+	// dropped as "no matching rule". This must run before SNAT so the tracked
+	// tuple matches what RunIn sees after DNAT on the inbound side. Select
+	// between the normal and jailed filters the same way
+	// filterPacketOutboundToWireGuard does, so jailed peers (e.g. Mullvad exit
+	// nodes) record state on the filter that will run on the reply. See #14229
+	// and #20064.
+	if !t.disableFilter {
+		var filt *filter.Filter
+		if pc.outboundPacketIsJailed(p) {
+			filt = t.jailedFilter.Load()
+		} else {
+			filt = t.filter.Load()
+		}
+		if filt != nil {
+			filt.UpdateOutboundFlowState(p)
+		}
+	}
+
 	invertGSOChecksum(pkt, gso)
 	pc.snat(p)
 	invertGSOChecksum(pkt, gso)
@@ -1500,7 +1525,8 @@ func (t *Wrapper) injectOutboundPong(pp *packet.Parsed, req packet.TSMPPingReque
 // InjectOutbound makes the Wrapper device behave as if a packet
 // with the given contents was sent to the network.
 // It does not block, but takes ownership of the packet.
-// The injected packet will not pass through outbound filters.
+// The injected packet will not pass through outbound filter rules,
+// but UDP/SCTP flow state is recorded so inbound replies are admitted.
 // Injecting an empty packet is a no-op.
 func (t *Wrapper) InjectOutbound(pkt []byte) error {
 	if len(pkt) > MaxPacketSize {
@@ -458,6 +458,71 @@ func TestFilter(t *testing.T) {
 	assertMetricPackets(t, "outACL", 0, metricOutboundDroppedPacketsACL)
 }

+// TestInjectOutboundRecordsUDPFlowState verifies that an injected outbound UDP
+// packet (as produced by netstack on userspace-networking / tsnet / SOCKS5
+// callers) records reverse-flow state so that the matching inbound reply is
+// admitted by the inbound filter, even when no explicit ACL rule covers the
+// reply. See tailscale/tailscale#14229 and tailscale/tailscale#20064.
+func TestInjectOutboundRecordsUDPFlowState(t *testing.T) {
+	bus := eventbustest.NewBus(t)
+	chtun, tun := newChannelTUN(t.Logf, bus, true) // secure: install filter
+	defer tun.Close()
+
+	// 53 isn't in setfilter's allowed inbound port range (89-90), so a reply
+	// from 5.6.7.8:53 → 1.2.3.4:<port> is only admissible via reverse-flow
+	// state recorded by the prior outbound packet.
+	const localPort, peerPort = 33333, 53
+	const localIP, peerIP = "1.2.3.4", "5.6.7.8"
+
+	// Inject a UDP packet outbound. Run in a goroutine since
+	// InjectOutbound blocks on the unbuffered vectorOutbound channel
+	// until Read drains it.
+	go func() {
+		if err := tun.InjectOutbound(udp4(localIP, peerIP, localPort, peerPort)); err != nil {
+			t.Errorf("InjectOutbound: %v", err)
+		}
+	}()
+
+	// Drain the injected packet via Read. This drives injectedRead, which
+	// is what records the reverse-flow tuple in filter state.
+	var buf [MaxPacketSize]byte
+	sizes := make([]int, 1)
+	if n, err := tun.Read([][]byte{buf[:]}, sizes, 0); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("Read: %v", err)
+	} else if n != 1 {
+		t.Fatalf("Read returned %d packets, want 1", n)
+	}
+
+	// Now simulate the inbound UDP reply. Without flow-state tracking on the
+	// injected outbound path, the inbound filter has no matching rule and
+	// drops the reply silently. With tracking, it should be delivered.
+	replyPkt := udp4(peerIP, localIP, peerPort, localPort)
+
+	// tun.Write blocks writing to chtun.Inbound when the filter accepts the
+	// packet, so drain Inbound concurrently and confirm delivery there.
+	delivered := make(chan []byte, 1)
+	go func() {
+		select {
+		case got := <-chtun.Inbound:
+			delivered <- got
+		case <-tun.closed:
+		}
+	}()
+
+	if _, err := tun.Write([][]byte{replyPkt}, 0); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("Write: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	select {
+	case got := <-delivered:
+		if !bytes.Equal(got, replyPkt) {
+			t.Errorf("delivered packet mismatch")
+		}
+	case <-time.After(5 * time.Second):
+		t.Fatal("inbound UDP reply was dropped by filter; injected outbound did not record flow state")
+	}
+}
+
 func assertMetricPackets(t *testing.T, metricName string, want, got int64) {
 	t.Helper()
 	if want != got {
@@ -63,6 +63,7 @@ import (
 	"tailscale.com/types/views"
 	"tailscale.com/util/mak"
 	"tailscale.com/util/must"
+	"tailscale.com/wgengine/filter"
 )

 // pingTimeout returns a per-ping budget for use within the larger test ctx:
@@ -3169,6 +3170,146 @@ func TestDialUDP(t *testing.T) {
 	})
 }

+// TestDialUDPInjectedReadRecordsFlowState reproduces tailscale/tailscale#14229
+// and #20064: a tsnet/netstack client dialing UDP must record reverse-flow
+// state in its inbound filter for the outbound packet it injects via
+// [netstack.Impl] → [tstun.Wrapper.InjectOutboundPacketBuffer]. If it doesn't,
+// the inbound reply is silently dropped by the inbound packet filter when no
+// ACL rule explicitly admits it.
+//
+// [TestDialUDP] doesn't catch this because [testcontrol.Server] serves
+// [tailcfg.FilterAllowAll] by default, so the reply is always admitted by
+// rule and the flow-state path is never exercised. Each subtest below sets
+// up s1 and s2 so that the inbound reply is admissible only via the
+// reverse-flow state recorded when s2 dialed.
+func TestDialUDPInjectedReadRecordsFlowState(t *testing.T) {
+	// RestrictedACL replaces the default allow-all PacketFilter with a
+	// one-way rule that permits s2 → s1 only. The reply path s1 → s2 matches
+	// no rule, so it can only be admitted by reverse-flow state on s2's
+	// main filter.
+	t.Run("RestrictedACL", func(t *testing.T) {
+		lt := setupTwoClientTest(t, false) // netstack on both sides.
+		rule := []tailcfg.FilterRule{{
+			SrcIPs: []string{lt.s2ip4.String(), lt.s2ip6.String()},
+			DstPorts: []tailcfg.NetPortRange{
+				{IP: lt.s1ip4.String(), Ports: tailcfg.PortRange{First: 0, Last: 65535}},
+				{IP: lt.s1ip6.String(), Ports: tailcfg.PortRange{First: 0, Last: 65535}},
+			},
+			IPProto: []int{int(ipproto.TCP), int(ipproto.UDP)},
+		}}
+
+		for _, s := range []*Server{lt.s1, lt.s2} {
+			if !lt.control.AddRawMapResponse(s.lb.NodeKey(), &tailcfg.MapResponse{
+				PacketFilter: rule,
+			}) {
+				t.Fatalf("AddRawMapResponse(%s) failed", s.Hostname)
+			}
+		}
+
+		// PacketFilter-only changes don't necessarily fire peer/netmap
+		// notifications, so poll the wgengine filter directly.
+		if err := tstest.WaitFor(30*time.Second, func() error {
+			f := lt.s2.lb.GetFilterForTest()
+			if f == nil {
+				return errors.New("no filter yet")
+			}
+			if got := f.Check(lt.s1ip4, lt.s2ip4, 1234, ipproto.UDP); got != filter.Drop {
+				return fmt.Errorf("inbound s1 → s2:1234 UDP: got %v, want Drop", got)
+			}
+			return nil
+		}); err != nil {
+			t.Fatalf("waiting for restrictive filter on s2: %v", err)
+		}
+
+		runDialUDPEcho(t, lt)
+	})
+
+	// JailedPeer marks s1 as jailed from s2's perspective. tstun.Wrapper
+	// then routes s2's outbound to s1 and inbound from s1 through a
+	// separate "jailed" filter (a shields-up filter with no rules; also
+	// used for Mullvad exit nodes). The reply path can only be admitted
+	// by reverse-flow state on the *jailed* filter, so injectedRead must
+	// select the right filter for the outbound packet.
+	t.Run("JailedPeer", func(t *testing.T) {
+		lt := setupTwoClientTest(t, false) // netstack on both sides.
+		s1Key := lt.s1.lb.NodeKey()
+		lt.control.SetJailed(lt.s2.lb.NodeKey(), s1Key, true)
+
+		ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(t.Context(), 30*time.Second)
+		defer cancel()
+		if err := waitFor(t, ctx, lt.s2, func(nm *netmap.NetworkMap) bool {
+			for _, p := range nm.Peers {
+				if p.Key() == s1Key && p.IsJailed() {
+					return true
+				}
+			}
+			return false
+		}); err != nil {
+			t.Fatalf("waiting for s1 to appear jailed in s2's netmap: %v", err)
+		}
+
+		runDialUDPEcho(t, lt)
+	})
+}
+
+// runDialUDPEcho runs an s2.Dial("udp", s1-listener)/Write/Read round trip
+// against listeners on lt.s1's IPv4 and IPv6 addresses as t.Run subtests,
+// asserting that the echoed reply makes it back to s2. The caller is
+// responsible for configuring lt so that the inbound reply on s2 is only
+// admissible via reverse-flow state recorded by the outbound dial.
+func runDialUDPEcho(t *testing.T, lt *listenTest) {
+	t.Helper()
+	test := func(t *testing.T, listenIP netip.Addr) {
+		pc, err := lt.s1.ListenPacket("udp", netip.AddrPortFrom(listenIP, 0).String())
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatalf("ListenPacket: %v", err)
+		}
+		defer pc.Close()
+
+		echoErr := make(chan error, 1)
+		go func() {
+			buf := make([]byte, 1500)
+			n, addr, err := pc.ReadFrom(buf)
+			if err != nil {
+				echoErr <- err
+				return
+			}
+			if _, err := pc.WriteTo(buf[:n], addr); err != nil {
+				echoErr <- err
+			}
+		}()
+
+		conn, err := lt.s2.Dial(t.Context(), "udp", pc.LocalAddr().String())
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatalf("Dial: %v", err)
+		}
+		defer conn.Close()
+
+		want := "hello udp"
+		if _, err := conn.Write([]byte(want)); err != nil {
+			t.Fatalf("Write: %v", err)
+		}
+
+		conn.SetReadDeadline(time.Now().Add(5 * time.Second))
+		got := make([]byte, 1024)
+		n, err := conn.Read(got)
+		if err != nil {
+			select {
+			case e := <-echoErr:
+				t.Fatalf("echo error: %v; read error: %v", e, err)
+			default:
+				t.Fatalf("UDP reply dropped — injectedRead didn't record flow state on the filter that runs on the reply (#14229, #20064): %v", err)
+			}
+		}
+		if string(got[:n]) != want {
+			t.Errorf("got %q, want %q", got[:n], want)
+		}
+	}
+
+	t.Run("IPv4", func(t *testing.T) { test(t, lt.s1ip4) })
+	t.Run("IPv6", func(t *testing.T) { test(t, lt.s1ip6) })
+}
+
 // buildDNSQuery builds a UDP/IP packet containing a DNS query for name to the
 // Tailscale service IP (100.100.100.100 for IPv4, fd7a:115c:a1e0::53 for IPv6).
 func buildDNSQuery(name string, srcIP netip.Addr) []byte {
@@ -621,8 +621,25 @@ func (f *Filter) runIn6(q *packet.Parsed) (r Response, why string) {
 	return noVerdict, "no rules matched"
 }

-// runIn runs the output-specific part of the filter logic.
+// runOut runs the output-specific part of the filter logic.
 func (f *Filter) runOut(q *packet.Parsed) (r Response, why string) {
+	f.UpdateOutboundFlowState(q)
+	return Accept, "ok out"
+}
+
+// UpdateOutboundFlowState records reverse-flow connection-tracking state for
+// the given outbound packet so that subsequent inbound replies on the same
+// flow are admitted by [Filter.RunIn] without an explicit allow rule.
+//
+// Only UDP and SCTP packets are tracked; for other protocols this is a no-op.
+//
+// It is intended for callers that synthesize outbound packets and bypass
+// [Filter.RunOut] (for example netstack's [InjectOutbound] path used by
+// userspace networking, tsnet and the SOCKS5/HTTP proxies), so that reply
+// packets matching an outbound UDP flow are not silently dropped as "no
+// matching rule" by [Filter.RunIn]. See tailscale/tailscale#14229 and
+// tailscale/tailscale#20064.
+func (f *Filter) UpdateOutboundFlowState(q *packet.Parsed) {
 	switch q.IPProto {
 	case ipproto.UDP, ipproto.SCTP:
 		tuple := flowtrack.MakeTuple(q.IPProto, q.Dst, q.Src) // src/dst reversed
@@ -630,7 +647,6 @@ func (f *Filter) runOut(q *packet.Parsed) (r Response, why string) {
 		f.state.lru.Add(tuple, struct{}{})
 		f.state.mu.Unlock()
 	}
-	return Accept, "ok out"
 }

 // direction is whether a packet was flowing into this machine, or