// Copyright (c) Tailscale Inc & contributors
// SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause

// Package kubestore contains an ipn.StateStore implementation using Kubernetes Secrets.
package kubestore

import (
	"bytes"
	"context"
	"crypto/sha256"
	"encoding/json"
	"fmt"
	"net"
	"net/http"
	"os"
	"strings"
	"time"

	"tailscale.com/envknob"
	"tailscale.com/ipn"
	"tailscale.com/ipn/store"
	"tailscale.com/ipn/store/mem"
	"tailscale.com/kube/kubeapi"
	"tailscale.com/kube/kubeclient"
	"tailscale.com/kube/kubetypes"
	"tailscale.com/types/logger"
	"tailscale.com/util/dnsname"
	"tailscale.com/util/mak"
)

func init() {
	store.Register("kube:", func(logf logger.Logf, path string) (ipn.StateStore, error) {
		secretName := strings.TrimPrefix(path, "kube:")
		return New(logf, secretName)
	})
}

const (
	// timeout is the timeout for a single state update that includes calls to the API server to write or read a
	// state Secret and emit an Event.
	timeout = 30 * time.Second

	reasonTailscaleStateUpdated      = "TailscaledStateUpdated"
	reasonTailscaleStateLoaded       = "TailscaleStateLoaded"
	reasonTailscaleStateUpdateFailed = "TailscaleStateUpdateFailed"
	reasonTailscaleStateLoadFailed   = "TailscaleStateLoadFailed"
	eventTypeWarning                 = "Warning"
	eventTypeNormal                  = "Normal"

	keyTLSCert = "tls.crt"
	keyTLSKey  = "tls.key"
	// keyACMEAcctFP is the cert Secret field that records the SHA-256
	// fingerprint of the PEM-encoded ACME account key that issued the
	// cert. The renewal path uses this to decide whether to include the
	// ARI "replaces" hint: only if the current account key matches
	// (otherwise Let's Encrypt rejects the claim).
	keyACMEAcctFP = "acme-account-fingerprint"

	// acmeAccountStateKey is the ipn.StateStore key under which tailscaled
	// stores its ACME account private key. Mirrors the acmePEMName constant
	// in ipn/ipnlocal/cert.go. Duplicated here to avoid an import cycle.
	acmeAccountStateKey = "acme-account.key.pem"
)

// Store is an ipn.StateStore that uses a Kubernetes Secret for persistence.
type Store struct {
	client        kubeclient.Client
	canPatch      bool
	secretName    string // state Secret
	certShareMode string // 'ro', 'rw', or empty
	podName       string

	// acmeAccountsSecretName, when non-empty in "rw" cert share mode,
	// routes reads and writes of acmeAccountStateKey to acmeAccountField
	// inside this shared per-tailnet Secret. See #18251.
	acmeAccountsSecretName string
	acmeAccountField       string

	// preAdoptedLocalKey is the SHA-256 of the per-pod ACME account key
	// that was in the local state Secret before we adopted a foreign
	// shared key. Non-nil only when adoption changed the key.
	preAdoptedLocalKey []byte

	logf logger.Logf

	// memory holds the latest tailscale state. Writes write state to a kube
	// Secret and memory, Reads read from memory.
	memory mem.Store
}

// New returns a new Store that persists state to Kubernets Secret(s).
// Tailscale state is stored in a Secret named by the secretName parameter.
// TLS certs are stored and retrieved from state Secret or separate Secrets
// named after TLS endpoints if running in cert share mode.
func New(logf logger.Logf, secretName string) (*Store, error) {
	c, err := newClient()
	if err != nil {
		return nil, err
	}
	return newWithClient(logf, c, secretName)
}

func newClient() (kubeclient.Client, error) {
	c, err := kubeclient.New("tailscale-state-store")
	if err != nil {
		return nil, err
	}
	if os.Getenv("TS_KUBERNETES_READ_API_SERVER_ADDRESS_FROM_ENV") == "true" {
		// Derive the API server address from the environment variables
		c.SetURL(fmt.Sprintf("https://%s:%s", os.Getenv("KUBERNETES_SERVICE_HOST"), os.Getenv("KUBERNETES_SERVICE_PORT_HTTPS")))
	}
	return c, nil
}

func newWithClient(logf logger.Logf, c kubeclient.Client, secretName string) (*Store, error) {
	canPatch, _, err := c.CheckSecretPermissions(context.Background(), secretName)
	if err != nil {
		return nil, err
	}
	s := &Store{
		client:     c,
		canPatch:   canPatch,
		secretName: secretName,
		podName:    os.Getenv("POD_NAME"),
		logf:       logf,
	}
	if envknob.IsCertShareReadWriteMode() {
		s.certShareMode = "rw"
	} else if envknob.IsCertShareReadOnlyMode() {
		s.certShareMode = "ro"
	}

	// Configure shared ACME account lookup. Only meaningful for the cert
	// issuer (cert share "rw") — read replicas never issue.
	if s.certShareMode == "rw" {
		s.acmeAccountsSecretName = os.Getenv("TS_ACME_ACCOUNT_SECRET_NAME")
		s.acmeAccountField = os.Getenv("TS_ACME_ACCOUNT_FIELD")
		if s.acmeAccountsSecretName != "" && s.acmeAccountField == "" {
			s.logf("[unexpected] TS_ACME_ACCOUNT_SECRET_NAME set without TS_ACME_ACCOUNT_FIELD; ignoring shared ACME account configuration")
			s.acmeAccountsSecretName = ""
		}
	}

	// Load latest state from kube Secret if it already exists.
	if err := s.loadState(); err != nil && err != ipn.ErrStateNotExist {
		return nil, fmt.Errorf("error loading state from kube Secret: %w", err)
	}
	// If we are in read-only cert share mode, pre-load existing shared certs.
	// Write replicas never load certs in-memory to avoid a situation where,
	// after Ingress recreation (and the associated cert Secret recreation), new
	// TLS certs don't get issued because the write replica still has certs
	// in-memory. Instead, write replicas fetch certs from Secret on each request.
	if s.certShareMode == "ro" {
		sel := s.certSecretSelector()
		if err := s.loadCerts(context.Background(), sel); err != nil {
			// We will attempt to again retrieve the certs from Secrets when a request for an HTTPS endpoint
			// is received.
			s.logf("[unexpected] error loading TLS certs: %v", err)
		}
	}
	if s.certShareMode == "ro" {
		go s.runCertReload(context.Background())
	}
	if s.acmeAccountsSecretName != "" {
		if err := s.reconcileSharedACMEAccountKey(); err != nil {
			// Non-fatal: the cert loop will retry on next issuance.
			s.logf("kubestore: reconciling shared ACME account key: %v", err)
		}
	}
	return s, nil
}

// reconcileSharedACMEAccountKey aligns the in-memory ACME account key with
// the shared per-tailnet field: adopt the shared value if present, otherwise
// copy the local per-pod key up so upgrading deployments keep renewal
// continuity.
func (s *Store) reconcileSharedACMEAccountKey() error {
	ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), timeout)
	defer cancel()

	sharedSecret, err := s.client.GetSecret(ctx, s.acmeAccountsSecretName)
	if err != nil && !kubeclient.IsNotFoundErr(err) {
		return fmt.Errorf("reading shared ACME accounts Secret %q: %w", s.acmeAccountsSecretName, err)
	}
	var sharedKey []byte
	if sharedSecret != nil {
		sharedKey = sharedSecret.Data[sanitizeKey(s.acmeAccountField)]
	}
	if len(sharedKey) > 0 {
		// Shared field already populated for this tailnet. Adopt it. If
		// our local per-pod key differs, remember its fingerprint so
		// legacy certs on this pod (issued before we started stamping
		// fingerprints) can be recognised as mis-aligned on renewal.
		localKey, err := s.memory.ReadState(ipn.StateKey(acmeAccountStateKey))
		if err == nil && len(localKey) > 0 && !bytes.Equal(localKey, sharedKey) {
			sum := sha256.Sum256(localKey)
			s.preAdoptedLocalKey = sum[:]
		}
		s.memory.WriteState(ipn.StateKey(acmeAccountStateKey), sharedKey)
		return nil
	}

	// Shared field is empty. If we have a per-pod key from the state
	// Secret, copy it up so existing renewals stay exempt.
	localKey, err := s.memory.ReadState(ipn.StateKey(acmeAccountStateKey))
	if err != nil || len(localKey) == 0 {
		// Nothing local either; the cert loop will generate one on first
		// use and route the write through writeSharedACMEAccountKey.
		return nil
	}
	if err := s.writeSharedACMEAccountKey(localKey); err != nil {
		return fmt.Errorf("copying per-pod ACME account key to shared Secret: %w", err)
	}
	s.logf("kubestore: migrated per-pod ACME account key into shared Secret %q field %q", s.acmeAccountsSecretName, s.acmeAccountField)
	return nil
}

// writeSharedACMEAccountKey writes key to acmeAccountField inside
// acmeAccountsSecretName, using whichever access pattern (patch or update)
// this Store has permission for.
func (s *Store) writeSharedACMEAccountKey(key []byte) error {
	return s.updateSecret(map[string][]byte{s.acmeAccountField: key}, s.acmeAccountsSecretName)
}

// maybeRestoreSharedACMEAccountKey writes the in-memory ACME account key to
// the shared Secret's per-tailnet field if that field is empty or missing,
// e.g. because the Secret was deleted and recreated while this process was
// running. It never overwrites an existing shared key.
func (s *Store) maybeRestoreSharedACMEAccountKey() error {
	if s.acmeAccountsSecretName == "" {
		return nil
	}
	key, err := s.memory.ReadState(ipn.StateKey(acmeAccountStateKey))
	if err != nil || len(key) == 0 {
		return nil
	}
	ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), timeout)
	defer cancel()
	shared, err := s.client.GetSecret(ctx, s.acmeAccountsSecretName)
	if err != nil && !kubeclient.IsNotFoundErr(err) {
		return fmt.Errorf("reading shared ACME accounts Secret %q: %w", s.acmeAccountsSecretName, err)
	}
	if shared != nil && len(shared.Data[sanitizeKey(s.acmeAccountField)]) > 0 {
		return nil
	}
	s.logf("kubestore: shared ACME accounts Secret %q field %q is empty; restoring account key from memory", s.acmeAccountsSecretName, s.acmeAccountField)
	return s.writeSharedACMEAccountKey(key)
}

// acmeAccountKeyFingerprint returns the SHA-256 of the current in-memory
// PEM-encoded ACME account key, or (nil, false) if the key isn't set.
func acmeAccountKeyFingerprint(m *mem.Store) ([]byte, bool) {
	key, err := m.ReadState(ipn.StateKey(acmeAccountStateKey))
	if err != nil || len(key) == 0 {
		return nil, false
	}
	sum := sha256.Sum256(key)
	return sum[:], true
}

// ShouldUseARIReplacesForRenewal reports whether the current ACME account
// key matches the one that issued the cert for domain. See #18251.
func (s *Store) ShouldUseARIReplacesForRenewal(domain string) (bool, error) {
	if s.certShareMode != "rw" {
		return true, nil
	}
	curFP, ok := acmeAccountKeyFingerprint(&s.memory)
	if !ok {
		// No current account key in memory yet; nothing to compare.
		return true, nil
	}
	ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), timeout)
	defer cancel()
	sec, err := s.client.GetSecret(ctx, domain)
	if err != nil {
		if kubeclient.IsNotFoundErr(err) {
			return true, nil
		}
		return true, fmt.Errorf("getting TLS Secret %q: %w", domain, err)
	}
	certFP := sec.Data[keyACMEAcctFP]
	if len(certFP) == 0 {
		// Legacy cert, no fingerprint stamp. Assume misaligned only if
		// we adopted a foreign shared key.
		if len(s.preAdoptedLocalKey) > 0 {
			return false, nil
		}
		return true, nil
	}
	return bytes.Equal(certFP, curFP), nil
}

func (s *Store) SetDialer(d func(ctx context.Context, network, address string) (net.Conn, error)) {
	s.client.SetDialer(d)
}

func (s *Store) String() string { return "kube.Store" }

// ReadState implements the StateStore interface.
func (s *Store) ReadState(id ipn.StateKey) ([]byte, error) {
	return s.memory.ReadState(ipn.StateKey(sanitizeKey(id)))
}

// WriteState implements the StateStore interface.
func (s *Store) WriteState(id ipn.StateKey, bs []byte) (err error) {
	defer func() {
		if err == nil {
			s.memory.WriteState(ipn.StateKey(sanitizeKey(id)), bs)
		}
	}()
	if s.acmeAccountsSecretName != "" && string(id) == acmeAccountStateKey {
		if bs == nil {
			return s.removeSecretField(s.acmeAccountField, s.acmeAccountsSecretName)
		}
		return s.writeSharedACMEAccountKey(bs)
	}
	if bs == nil {
		return s.removeSecretField(string(id), s.secretName)
	}
	return s.updateSecret(map[string][]byte{string(id): bs}, s.secretName)
}

// WriteTLSCertAndKey writes a TLS cert and key to domain.crt, domain.key fields
// of a Tailscale Kubernetes node's state Secret. In cert-share "rw" mode it
// also stamps acme-account-fingerprint alongside the cert so the renewal path
// can tell whether the current ACME account key issued this cert.
func (s *Store) WriteTLSCertAndKey(domain string, cert, key []byte) (err error) {
	if s.certShareMode == "ro" {
		s.logf("[unexpected] TLS cert and key write in read-only mode")
	}
	if err := dnsname.ValidHostname(domain); err != nil {
		return fmt.Errorf("invalid domain name %q: %w", domain, err)
	}
	secretName := s.secretName
	data := map[string][]byte{
		domain + ".crt": cert,
		domain + ".key": key,
	}
	// If we run in cert share mode, cert and key for a DNS name are written
	// to a separate Secret.
	if s.certShareMode == "rw" {
		secretName = domain
		data = map[string][]byte{
			keyTLSCert: cert,
			keyTLSKey:  key,
		}
		if fp, ok := acmeAccountKeyFingerprint(&s.memory); ok {
			data[keyACMEAcctFP] = fp
		}
		// The shared Secret may have been deleted and recreated empty
		// while we were running; re-assert the account key if so.
		if err := s.maybeRestoreSharedACMEAccountKey(); err != nil {
			s.logf("kubestore: restoring shared ACME account key: %v", err)
		}
	}
	if err := s.updateSecret(data, secretName); err != nil {
		return fmt.Errorf("error writing TLS cert and key to Secret: %w", err)
	}
	// TODO(irbekrm): certs for write replicas are currently not
	// written to memory to avoid out of sync memory state after
	// Ingress resources have been recreated.  This means that TLS
	// certs for write replicas are retrieved from the Secret on
	// each HTTPS request. This is a temporary solution till we
	// implement a Secret watch.
	if s.certShareMode != "rw" {
		s.memory.WriteState(ipn.StateKey(domain+".crt"), cert)
		s.memory.WriteState(ipn.StateKey(domain+".key"), key)
	}
	return nil
}

// ReadTLSCertAndKey reads a TLS cert and key from memory or from a
// domain-specific Secret. It first checks the in-memory store, if not found in
// memory and running cert store in read-only mode, looks up a Secret.
// Note that write replicas of HA Ingress always retrieve TLS certs from Secrets.
func (s *Store) ReadTLSCertAndKey(domain string) (cert, key []byte, err error) {
	if err := dnsname.ValidHostname(domain); err != nil {
		return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid domain name %q: %w", domain, err)
	}
	certKey := domain + ".crt"
	keyKey := domain + ".key"
	cert, err = s.memory.ReadState(ipn.StateKey(certKey))
	if err == nil {
		key, err = s.memory.ReadState(ipn.StateKey(keyKey))
		if err == nil {
			return cert, key, nil
		}
	}
	if s.certShareMode == "" {
		return nil, nil, ipn.ErrStateNotExist
	}

	ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), timeout)
	defer cancel()
	secret, err := s.client.GetSecret(ctx, domain)
	if err != nil {
		if kubeclient.IsNotFoundErr(err) {
			// TODO(irbekrm): we should return a more specific error
			// that wraps ipn.ErrStateNotExist here.
			return nil, nil, ipn.ErrStateNotExist
		}
		st, ok := err.(*kubeapi.Status)
		if ok && st.Code == http.StatusForbidden && (s.certShareMode == "ro" || s.certShareMode == "rw") {
			// In cert share mode, we read from a dedicated Secret per domain.
			// To get here, we already had a cache miss from our in-memory
			// store. For write replicas, that means it wasn't available on
			// start and it wasn't written since. For read replicas, that means
			// it wasn't available on start and it hasn't been reloaded in the
			// background. So getting a "forbidden" error is an expected
			// "not found" case where we've been asked for a cert we don't
			// expect to issue, and so the forbidden error reflects that the
			// operator didn't assign permission for a Secret for that domain.
			//
			// This code path gets triggered by the admin UI's machine page,
			// which queries for the node's own TLS cert existing via the
			// "tls-cert-status" c2n API.
			return nil, nil, ipn.ErrStateNotExist
		}
		return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("getting TLS Secret %q: %w", domain, err)
	}
	cert = secret.Data[keyTLSCert]
	key = secret.Data[keyTLSKey]
	if len(cert) == 0 || len(key) == 0 {
		return nil, nil, ipn.ErrStateNotExist
	}
	// TODO(irbekrm): a read between these two separate writes would
	// get a mismatched cert and key.  Allow writing both cert and
	// key to the memory store in a single, lock-protected operation.
	//
	// TODO(irbekrm): currently certs for write replicas of HA Ingress get
	// retrieved from the cluster Secret on each HTTPS request to avoid a
	// situation when after Ingress recreation stale certs are read from
	// memory.
	// Fix this by watching Secrets to ensure that memory store gets updated
	// when Secrets are deleted.
	if s.certShareMode == "ro" {
		s.memory.WriteState(ipn.StateKey(certKey), cert)
		s.memory.WriteState(ipn.StateKey(keyKey), key)
	}
	return cert, key, nil
}

func (s *Store) updateSecret(data map[string][]byte, secretName string) (err error) {
	ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), timeout)
	defer func() {
		if err != nil {
			if err := s.client.Event(ctx, eventTypeWarning, reasonTailscaleStateUpdateFailed, err.Error()); err != nil {
				s.logf("kubestore: error creating tailscaled state update Event: %v", err)
			}
		} else {
			if err := s.client.Event(ctx, eventTypeNormal, reasonTailscaleStateUpdated, "Successfully updated tailscaled state Secret"); err != nil {
				s.logf("kubestore: error creating tailscaled state Event: %v", err)
			}
		}
		cancel()
	}()
	secret, err := s.client.GetSecret(ctx, secretName)
	if err != nil {
		// If the Secret does not exist, create it with the required data.
		if kubeclient.IsNotFoundErr(err) && s.canCreateSecret(secretName) {
			return s.client.CreateSecret(ctx, &kubeapi.Secret{
				TypeMeta: kubeapi.TypeMeta{
					APIVersion: "v1",
					Kind:       "Secret",
				},
				ObjectMeta: kubeapi.ObjectMeta{
					Name: secretName,
				},
				Data: func(m map[string][]byte) map[string][]byte {
					d := make(map[string][]byte, len(m))
					for key, val := range m {
						d[sanitizeKey(key)] = val
					}
					return d
				}(data),
			})
		}
		return fmt.Errorf("error getting Secret %s: %w", secretName, err)
	}
	if s.canPatchSecret(secretName) {
		var m []kubeclient.JSONPatch
		// If the user has pre-created a Secret with no data, we need to ensure the top level /data field.
		if len(secret.Data) == 0 {
			m = []kubeclient.JSONPatch{
				{
					Op:   "add",
					Path: "/data",
					Value: func(m map[string][]byte) map[string][]byte {
						d := make(map[string][]byte, len(m))
						for key, val := range m {
							d[sanitizeKey(key)] = val
						}
						return d
					}(data),
				},
			}
			// If the Secret has data, patch it with the new data.
		} else {
			for key, val := range data {
				m = append(m, kubeclient.JSONPatch{
					Op:    "add",
					Path:  "/data/" + sanitizeKey(key),
					Value: val,
				})
			}
		}
		if err := s.client.JSONPatchResource(ctx, secretName, kubeclient.TypeSecrets, m); err != nil {
			return fmt.Errorf("error patching Secret %s: %w", secretName, err)
		}
		return nil
	}
	// No patch permissions, use UPDATE instead.
	for key, val := range data {
		mak.Set(&secret.Data, sanitizeKey(key), val)
	}
	if err := s.client.UpdateSecret(ctx, secret); err != nil {
		return fmt.Errorf("error updating Secret %s: %w", s.secretName, err)
	}
	return nil
}

func (s *Store) removeSecretField(key, secretName string) error {
	ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), timeout)
	defer cancel()
	if s.canPatchSecret(secretName) {
		return s.client.JSONPatchResource(ctx, secretName, kubeclient.TypeSecrets, []kubeclient.JSONPatch{
			{
				Op:   "remove",
				Path: "/data/" + sanitizeKey(ipn.StateKey(key)),
			},
		})
	}
	// No patch permissions, use UPDATE: get the secret, delete the key, update.
	secret, err := s.client.GetSecret(ctx, secretName)
	if err != nil {
		return fmt.Errorf("error getting Secret %s: %w", secretName, err)
	}
	delete(secret.Data, sanitizeKey(ipn.StateKey(key)))
	if err := s.client.UpdateSecret(ctx, secret); err != nil {
		return fmt.Errorf("error updating Secret %s: %w", secretName, err)
	}
	return nil
}

func (s *Store) loadState() (err error) {
	ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), timeout)
	defer cancel()

	secret, err := s.client.GetSecret(ctx, s.secretName)
	if err != nil {
		if st, ok := err.(*kubeapi.Status); ok && st.Code == 404 {
			return ipn.ErrStateNotExist
		}
		if err := s.client.Event(ctx, eventTypeWarning, reasonTailscaleStateLoadFailed, err.Error()); err != nil {
			s.logf("kubestore: error creating Event: %v", err)
		}
		return err
	}
	if err := s.client.Event(ctx, eventTypeNormal, reasonTailscaleStateLoaded, "Successfully loaded tailscaled state from Secret"); err != nil {
		s.logf("kubestore: error creating Event: %v", err)
	}
	data, err := s.maybeStripAttestationKeyFromProfile(secret.Data)
	if err != nil {
		return fmt.Errorf("error attempting to strip attestation data from state Secret: %w", err)
	}
	s.memory.LoadFromMap(data)
	return nil
}

// maybeStripAttestationKeyFromProfile removes the hardware attestation key
// field from serialized Tailscale profile. This is done to recover from a bug
// introduced in 1.92, where node-bound hardware attestation keys were added to
// Tailscale states stored in Kubernetes Secrets.
// See https://github.com/tailscale/tailscale/issues/18302
// TODO(irbekrm): it would be good if we could somehow determine when we no
// longer need to run this check.
func (s *Store) maybeStripAttestationKeyFromProfile(data map[string][]byte) (map[string][]byte, error) {
	prefsKey := extractPrefsKey(data)
	prefsBytes, ok := data[prefsKey]
	if !ok {
		return data, nil
	}
	var prefs map[string]any
	if err := json.Unmarshal(prefsBytes, &prefs); err != nil {
		s.logf("[unexpected]: kube store: failed to unmarshal prefs data")
		// don't error as in most cases the state won't have the attestation key
		return data, nil
	}

	config, ok := prefs["Config"].(map[string]any)
	if !ok {
		return data, nil
	}
	if _, hasKey := config["AttestationKey"]; !hasKey {
		return data, nil
	}
	s.logf("kube store: found redundant attestation key, deleting")
	delete(config, "AttestationKey")
	prefsBytes, err := json.Marshal(prefs)
	if err != nil {
		return nil, fmt.Errorf("[unexpected] kube store: failed to marshal profile after removing attestation key: %v", err)
	}
	data[prefsKey] = prefsBytes
	if err := s.updateSecret(map[string][]byte{prefsKey: prefsBytes}, s.secretName); err != nil {
		// don't error out - this might have been a temporary kube API server
		// connection issue. The key will be removed from the in-memory cache
		// and we'll retry updating the Secret on the next restart.
		s.logf("kube store: error updating Secret after stripping AttestationKey: %v", err)
	}
	return data, nil
}

const currentProfileKey = "_current-profile"

// extractPrefs returns the key at which Tailscale prefs are stored in the
// provided Secret data.
func extractPrefsKey(data map[string][]byte) string {
	return string(data[currentProfileKey])
}

// runCertReload relists and reloads all TLS certs for endpoints shared by this
// node from Secrets other than the state Secret to ensure that renewed certs get eventually loaded.
// It is not critical to reload a cert immediately after
// renewal, so a daily check is acceptable.
// Currently (3/2025) this is only used for the shared HA Ingress certs on 'read' replicas.
// Note that if shared certs are not found in memory on an HTTPS request, we
// do a Secret lookup, so this mechanism does not need to ensure that newly
// added Ingresses' certs get loaded.
func (s *Store) runCertReload(ctx context.Context) {
	ticker := time.NewTicker(time.Hour * 24)
	defer ticker.Stop()
	for {
		select {
		case <-ctx.Done():
			return
		case <-ticker.C:
			sel := s.certSecretSelector()
			if err := s.loadCerts(ctx, sel); err != nil {
				s.logf("[unexpected] error reloading TLS certs: %v", err)
			}
		}
	}
}

// loadCerts lists all Secrets matching the provided selector and loads TLS
// certs and keys from those.
func (s *Store) loadCerts(ctx context.Context, sel map[string]string) error {
	ss, err := s.client.ListSecrets(ctx, sel)
	if err != nil {
		return fmt.Errorf("error listing TLS Secrets: %w", err)
	}
	for _, secret := range ss.Items {
		if !hasTLSData(&secret) {
			continue
		}
		// Only load secrets that have valid domain names (ending in .ts.net)
		if !strings.HasSuffix(secret.Name, ".ts.net") {
			continue
		}
		s.memory.WriteState(ipn.StateKey(secret.Name)+".crt", secret.Data[keyTLSCert])
		s.memory.WriteState(ipn.StateKey(secret.Name)+".key", secret.Data[keyTLSKey])
	}
	return nil
}

// canCreateSecret returns true if this node should be allowed to create the given
// Secret in its namespace.
func (s *Store) canCreateSecret(secret string) bool {
	// Only allow creating the state Secret (and not TLS Secrets). The
	// shared ACME accounts Secret is precreated by the operator, so write
	// replicas never need create permission for it.
	return secret == s.secretName
}

// canPatchSecret returns true if this node should be allowed to patch the given
// Secret.
func (s *Store) canPatchSecret(secret string) bool {
	// For backwards compatibility reasons, setups where the proxies are not
	// given PATCH permissions for state Secrets are allowed. For TLS
	// Secrets and the shared ACME accounts Secret, we should always have
	// PATCH permissions.
	if secret == s.secretName {
		return s.canPatch
	}
	return true
}

// certSecretSelector returns a label selector that can be used to list all
// Secrets that aren't Tailscale state Secrets and contain TLS certificates for
// HTTPS endpoints that this node serves.
// Currently (7/2025) this only applies to the Kubernetes Operator's ProxyGroup
// when spec.Type is "ingress" or "kube-apiserver".
func (s *Store) certSecretSelector() map[string]string {
	if s.podName == "" {
		return map[string]string{}
	}
	p := strings.LastIndex(s.podName, "-")
	if p == -1 {
		return map[string]string{}
	}
	pgName := s.podName[:p]
	return map[string]string{
		kubetypes.LabelSecretType:   kubetypes.LabelSecretTypeCerts,
		kubetypes.LabelManaged:      "true",
		"tailscale.com/proxy-group": pgName,
	}
}

// hasTLSData returns true if the provided Secret contains non-empty TLS cert and key.
func hasTLSData(s *kubeapi.Secret) bool {
	return len(s.Data[keyTLSCert]) != 0 && len(s.Data[keyTLSKey]) != 0
}

// sanitizeKey converts any value that can be converted to a string into a valid Kubernetes Secret key.
// Valid characters are alphanumeric, -, _, and .
// https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/configuration/secret/#restriction-names-data.
func sanitizeKey[T ~string](k T) string {
	return strings.Map(func(r rune) rune {
		if r >= 'a' && r <= 'z' || r >= 'A' && r <= 'Z' || r >= '0' && r <= '9' || r == '-' || r == '_' || r == '.' {
			return r
		}
		return '_'
	}, string(k))
}