This file was never truly necessary and has never actually been used in
the history of Tailscale's open source releases.
A Brief History of AUTHORS files
---
The AUTHORS file was a pattern developed at Google, originally for
Chromium, then adopted by Go and a bunch of other projects. The problem
was that Chromium originally had a copyright line only recognizing
Google as the copyright holder. Because Google (and most open source
projects) do not require copyright assignemnt for contributions, each
contributor maintains their copyright. Some large corporate contributors
then tried to add their own name to the copyright line in the LICENSE
file or in file headers. This quickly becomes unwieldy, and puts a
tremendous burden on anyone building on top of Chromium, since the
license requires that they keep all copyright lines intact.
The compromise was to create an AUTHORS file that would list all of the
copyright holders. The LICENSE file and source file headers would then
include that list by reference, listing the copyright holder as "The
Chromium Authors".
This also become cumbersome to simply keep the file up to date with a
high rate of new contributors. Plus it's not always obvious who the
copyright holder is. Sometimes it is the individual making the
contribution, but many times it may be their employer. There is no way
for the proejct maintainer to know.
Eventually, Google changed their policy to no longer recommend trying to
keep the AUTHORS file up to date proactively, and instead to only add to
it when requested: https://opensource.google/docs/releasing/authors.
They are also clear that:
> Adding contributors to the AUTHORS file is entirely within the
> project's discretion and has no implications for copyright ownership.
It was primarily added to appease a small number of large contributors
that insisted that they be recognized as copyright holders (which was
entirely their right to do). But it's not truly necessary, and not even
the most accurate way of identifying contributors and/or copyright
holders.
In practice, we've never added anyone to our AUTHORS file. It only lists
Tailscale, so it's not really serving any purpose. It also causes
confusion because Tailscalars put the "Tailscale Inc & AUTHORS" header
in other open source repos which don't actually have an AUTHORS file, so
it's ambiguous what that means.
Instead, we just acknowledge that the contributors to Tailscale (whoever
they are) are copyright holders for their individual contributions. We
also have the benefit of using the DCO (developercertificate.org) which
provides some additional certification of their right to make the
contribution.
The source file changes were purely mechanical with:
git ls-files | xargs sed -i -e 's/\(Tailscale Inc &\) AUTHORS/\1 contributors/g'
Updates #cleanup
Change-Id: Ia101a4a3005adb9118051b3416f5a64a4a45987d
Signed-off-by: Will Norris <will@tailscale.com>
DA protection is not super helpful because we don't set an authorization
password on the key. But if authorization fails for other reasons (like
TPM being reset), we will eventually cause DA lockout with tailscaled
trying to load the key. DA lockout then leads to (1) issues for other
processes using the TPM and (2) the underlying authorization error being
masked in logs.
Updates #17654
Signed-off-by: Andrew Lytvynov <awly@tailscale.com>
The key.NewEmptyHardwareAttestationKey hook returns a non-nil empty
attestationKey, which means that the nil check in Clone doesn't trigger
and proceeds to try and clone an empty key. Check IsZero instead to
reduce log spam from Clone.
As a drive-by, make tpmAvailable check a sync.Once because the result
won't change.
Updates #17882
Signed-off-by: Andrew Lytvynov <awly@tailscale.com>
In particular on Windows, the `transport.TPMCloser` we get is not safe
for concurrent use. This is especially noticeable because
`tpm.attestationKey.Clone` uses the same open handle as the original
key. So wrap the operations on ak.tpm with a mutex and make a deep copy
with a new connection in Clone.
Updates #15830
Updates #17662
Updates #17644
Signed-off-by: Andrew Lytvynov <awly@tailscale.com>
On some platforms e.g. ChromeOS the owner hierarchy might not always be
available to us. To avoid stale sealing exceptions later we probe to
confirm it's working rather than rely solely on family indicator status.
Updates #17622
Signed-off-by: Patrick O'Doherty <patrick@tailscale.com>
Check that the TPM we have opened is advertised as a 2.0 family device
before using it for state sealing / hardware attestation.
Updates #17622
Signed-off-by: Patrick O'Doherty <patrick@tailscale.com>
I was debugging a customer issue and saw in their 1.88.3 logs:
TPM: error opening: stat /dev/tpm0: no such file or directory
That's unnecessary output. The lack of TPM will be reported by
them having a nil Hostinfo.TPM, which is plenty elsewhere in logs.
Let's only write out an "error opening" line if it's an interesting
error. (perhaps permissions, or EIO, etc)
Updates #cleanup
Change-Id: I3f987f6bf1d3ada03473ca3eef555e9cfafc7677
Signed-off-by: Brad Fitzpatrick <bradfitz@tailscale.com>
Extend Persist with AttestationKey to record a hardware-backed
attestation key for the node's identity.
Add a flag to tailscaled to allow users to control the use of
hardware-backed keys to bind node identity to individual machines.
Updates tailscale/corp#31269
Change-Id: Idcf40d730a448d85f07f1bebf387f086d4c58be3
Signed-off-by: Patrick O'Doherty <patrick@tailscale.com>
Whenever running on a platform that has a TPM (and tailscaled can access
it), default to encrypting the state. The user can still explicitly set
this flag to disable encryption.
Updates https://github.com/tailscale/corp/issues/32909
Signed-off-by: Andrew Lytvynov <awly@tailscale.com>
We will need this for unmarshaling node prefs: use the zero
HardwareAttestationKey implementation when parsing and later check
`IsZero` to see if anything was loaded.
Updates #15830
Signed-off-by: Andrew Lytvynov <awly@tailscale.com>
We can only register one key implementation per process. When running on
macOS or Android, trying to register a separate key implementation from
feature/tpm causes a panic.
Updates #15830
Signed-off-by: Andrew Lytvynov <awly@tailscale.com>
This function is behind a sync.Once so we should only see errors at
startup. In particular the error from `open` is useful to diagnose why
TPM might not be accessible.
Updates #15830
Signed-off-by: Andrew Lytvynov <awly@tailscale.com>
The tpmrm0 is a kernel-managed version of tpm0 that multiplexes multiple
concurrent connections. The basic tpm0 can only be accessed by one
application at a time, which can be pretty unreliable.
Updates #15830
Signed-off-by: Andrew Lytvynov <awly@tailscale.com>
Report whether the client is configured with state encryption (which
varies by platform and can be optional on some). Wire it up to
`--encrypt-state` in tailscaled, which is set for Linux/Windows, and set
defaults for other platforms. Macsys will also report this if full
Keychain migration is done.
Updates #15830
Signed-off-by: Andrew Lytvynov <awly@tailscale.com>
This method is only needed to migrate between store.FileStore and
tpm.tpmStore. We can make a runtime type assertion instead of
implementing an unused method for every platform.
Updates #15830
Signed-off-by: Andrew Lytvynov <awly@tailscale.com>
Add a new `--encrypt-state` flag to `cmd/tailscaled`. Based on that
flag, migrate the existing state file to/from encrypted format if
needed.
Updates #15830
Signed-off-by: Andrew Lytvynov <awly@tailscale.com>
Will Norris
Andrew Lytvynov
Patrick O'Doherty
Brad Fitzpatrick