* When we do the TKA sync, log whether TKA is enabled and whether
we want it to be enabled. This would help us see if a node is
making bootstrap errors.
* When we fail to look up an AUM locally, log the ID of the AUM
rather than a generic "file does not exist" error.
These AUM IDs are cryptographic hashes of the TKA state, which
itself just contains public keys and signatures. These IDs aren't
sensitive and logging them is safe.
Signed-off-by: Alex Chan <alexc@tailscale.com>
Updates https://github.com/tailscale/corp/issues/33594
This patch creates a set of tests that should be true for all implementations of Chonk and CompactableChonk, which we can share with the SQLite implementation in corp.
It includes all the existing tests, plus a test for LastActiveAncestor which was in corp but not in oss.
Updates https://github.com/tailscale/corp/issues/33465
Signed-off-by: Alex Chan <alexc@tailscale.com>
We soft-delete AUMs when they're purged, but when we call `ChildAUMs()`,
we look up soft-deleted AUMs to find the `Children` field.
This patch changes the behaviour of `ChildAUMs()` so it only looks at
not-deleted AUMs. This means we don't need to record child information
on AUMs any more, which is a minor space saving for any newly-recorded
AUMs.
Updates https://github.com/tailscale/tailscale/issues/17566
Updates https://github.com/tailscale/corp/issues/27166
Signed-off-by: Alex Chan <alexc@tailscale.com>
This method was added in cca25f6 in the initial in-memory implementation
of Chonk, but it's not part of the Chonk interface and isn't implemented
or used anywhere else. Let's get rid of it.
Updates https://github.com/tailscale/corp/issues/33465
Signed-off-by: Alex Chan <alexc@tailscale.com>
I noticed this while modularizing clientupdate. With this in first,
moving clientupdate to be modular removes a bunch more stuff from
the minimal build + tsnet.
Updates #17115
Change-Id: I44bd055fca65808633fd3a848b0bbc09b00ad4fa
Signed-off-by: Brad Fitzpatrick <bradfitz@tailscale.com>
When a rotation signature chain reaches a certain size, remove the
oldest rotation signature from the chain before wrapping it in a new
rotation signature.
Since all previous rotation signatures are signed by the same wrapping
pubkey (node's own tailnet lock key), the node can re-construct the
chain, re-signing previous rotation signatures. This will satisfy the
existing certificate validation logic.
Updates #13185
Signed-off-by: Anton Tolchanov <anton@tailscale.com>
In Tailnet Lock, there is an implicit limit on the number of rotation
signatures that can be chained before the signature becomes too long.
This program helps tailnet admins to identify nodes that have signatures
with long chains and prints commands to re-sign those node keys with a
fresh direct signature. It's a temporary mitigation measure, and we will
remove this tool as we design and implement a long-term approach for
rotation signatures.
Example output:
```
2024/08/20 18:25:03 Self: does not need re-signing
2024/08/20 18:25:03 Visible peers with valid signatures:
2024/08/20 18:25:03 Peer xxx2.yy.ts.net. (100.77.192.34) nodeid=nyDmhiZiGA11KTM59, current signature kind=direct: does not need re-signing
2024/08/20 18:25:03 Peer xxx3.yy.ts.net. (100.84.248.22) nodeid=ndQ64mDnaB11KTM59, current signature kind=direct: does not need re-signing
2024/08/20 18:25:03 Peer xxx4.yy.ts.net. (100.85.253.53) nodeid=nmZfVygzkB21KTM59, current signature kind=rotation: chain length 4, printing command to re-sign
tailscale lock sign nodekey:530bddbfbe69e91fe15758a1d6ead5337aa6307e55ac92dafad3794f8b3fc661 tlpub:4bf07597336703395f2149dce88e7c50dd8694ab5bbde3d7c2a1c7b3e231a3c2
```
To support this, the NetworkLockStatus localapi response now includes
information about signatures of all peers rather than just the invalid
ones. This is not displayed by default in `tailscale lock status`, but
will be surfaced in `tailscale lock status --json`.
Updates #13185
Signed-off-by: Anton Tolchanov <anton@tailscale.com>
Detection of duplicate Network Lock signature chains added in
01847e0123 failed to account for chains
originating with a SigCredential signature, which is used for wrapped
auth keys. This results in erroneous removal of signatures that
originate from the same re-usable auth key.
This change ensures that multiple nodes created by the same re-usable
auth key are not getting filtered out by the network lock.
Updates tailscale/corp#19764
Signed-off-by: Anton Tolchanov <anton@tailscale.com>
This change moves handling of wrapped auth keys to the `tka` package and
adds a test covering auth key originating signatures (SigCredential) in
netmap.
Updates tailscale/corp#19764
Signed-off-by: Anton Tolchanov <anton@tailscale.com>
A non-signing node can be allowed to re-sign its new node keys following
key renewal/rotation (e.g. via `tailscale up --force-reauth`). To be
able to do this, node's TLK is written into WrappingPubkey field of the
initial SigDirect signature, signed by a signing node.
The intended use of this field implies that, for each WrappingPubkey, we
typically expect to have at most one active node with a signature
tracing back to that key. Multiple valid signatures referring to the
same WrappingPubkey can occur if a client's state has been cloned, but
it's something we explicitly discourage and don't support:
https://tailscale.com/s/clone
This change propagates rotation details (wrapping public key, a list
of previous node keys that have been rotated out) to netmap processing,
and adds tracking of obsolete node keys that, when found, will get
filtered out.
Updates tailscale/corp#19764
Signed-off-by: Anton Tolchanov <anton@tailscale.com>
- Add current node signature to `ipnstate.NetworkLockStatus`;
- Print current node signature in a human-friendly format as part
of `tailscale lock status`.
Examples:
```
$ tailscale lock status
Tailnet lock is ENABLED.
This node is accessible under tailnet lock. Node signature:
SigKind: direct
Pubkey: [OTB3a]
KeyID: tlpub:44a0e23cd53a4b8acc02f6732813d8f5ba8b35d02d48bf94c9f1724ebe31c943
WrappingPubkey: tlpub:44a0e23cd53a4b8acc02f6732813d8f5ba8b35d02d48bf94c9f1724ebe31c943
This node's tailnet-lock key: tlpub:44a0e23cd53a4b8acc02f6732813d8f5ba8b35d02d48bf94c9f1724ebe31c943
Trusted signing keys:
tlpub:44a0e23cd53a4b8acc02f6732813d8f5ba8b35d02d48bf94c9f1724ebe31c943 1 (self)
tlpub:6fa21d242a202b290de85926ba3893a6861888679a73bc3a43f49539d67c9764 1 (pre-auth key kq3NzejWoS11KTM59)
```
For a node created via a signed auth key:
```
This node is accessible under tailnet lock. Node signature:
SigKind: rotation
Pubkey: [e3nAO]
Nested:
SigKind: credential
KeyID: tlpub:6fa21d242a202b290de85926ba3893a6861888679a73bc3a43f49539d67c9764
WrappingPubkey: tlpub:3623b0412cab0029cb1918806435709b5947ae03554050f20caf66629f21220a
```
For a node that rotated its key a few times:
```
This node is accessible under tailnet lock. Node signature:
SigKind: rotation
Pubkey: [DOzL4]
Nested:
SigKind: rotation
Pubkey: [S/9yU]
Nested:
SigKind: rotation
Pubkey: [9E9v4]
Nested:
SigKind: direct
Pubkey: [3QHTJ]
KeyID: tlpub:44a0e23cd53a4b8acc02f6732813d8f5ba8b35d02d48bf94c9f1724ebe31c943
WrappingPubkey: tlpub:2faa280025d3aba0884615f710d8c50590b052c01a004c2b4c2c9434702ae9d0
```
Updates tailscale/corp#19764
Signed-off-by: Anton Tolchanov <anton@tailscale.com>
Run `staticcheck` with `U1000` to find unused code. This cleans up about
a half of it. I'll do the other half separately to keep PRs manageable.
Updates #cleanup
Signed-off-by: Andrew Lytvynov <awly@tailscale.com>
I didn't clean up the more idiomatic map[T]bool with true values, at
least yet. I just converted the relatively awkward struct{}-valued
maps.
Updates #cleanup
Change-Id: I758abebd2bb1f64bc7a9d0f25c32298f4679c14f
Signed-off-by: Brad Fitzpatrick <bradfitz@tailscale.com>
This eventually allows encoding packages that may respect
the proposed encoding.TextAppender interface.
The performance gains from this is between 10-30%.
Updates tailscale/corp#14379
Signed-off-by: Joe Tsai <joetsai@digital-static.net>
The revoke-keys command allows nodes with tailnet lock keys
to collaborate to erase the use of a compromised key, and remove trust
in it.
Signed-off-by: Tom DNetto <tom@tailscale.com>
Updates ENG-1848
In late 2022 a subtle but crucial part of documentation was added to ed25519.Verify: It
will panic if len(publicKey) is not [PublicKeySize].
02ed0e5e67
This change catches that error so it won't lead to a panic.
Signed-off-by: Tom DNetto <tom@tailscale.com>
Updates https://github.com/tailscale/corp/issues/8568
This commit continues the work from #8303, providing a method for a
tka.Authority to generate valid deeplinks for signing devices. We'll
use this to provide the necessary deeplinks for users to sign from
their mobile devices.
Updates #8302
Signed-off-by: Ross Zurowski <ross@rosszurowski.com>
* tka: provide verify-deeplink local API endpoint
Fixes https://github.com/tailscale/tailscale/issues/8302
Signed-off-by: Andrea Gottardo <andrea@tailscale.com>
Address code review comments
Signed-off-by: Andrea Gottardo <andrea@tailscale.com>
Address code review comments by Ross
Signed-off-by: Andrea Gottardo <andrea@tailscale.com>
* Improve error encoding, fix logic error
Signed-off-by: Andrea Gottardo <andrea@tailscale.com>
---------
Signed-off-by: Andrea Gottardo <andrea@tailscale.com>
go vet complains when we copy a lock value. Create clone function that
copies everything but the lock value.
Fixes#8207
Signed-off-by: Val <valerie@tailscale.com>
This adds an initial and intentionally minimal configuration for
golang-ci, fixes the issues reported, and adds a GitHub Action to check
new pull requests against this linter configuration.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Dunham <andrew@du.nham.ca>
Change-Id: I8f38fbc315836a19a094d0d3e986758b9313f163
This updates all source files to use a new standard header for copyright
and license declaration. Notably, copyright no longer includes a date,
and we now use the standard SPDX-License-Identifier header.
This commit was done almost entirely mechanically with perl, and then
some minimal manual fixes.
Updates #6865
Signed-off-by: Will Norris <will@tailscale.com>
This reverts commit f1130421f0.
It was submitted with failing tests (go generate checks)
Requires a lot of API changes to fix so rolling back instead of
forward.
Change-Id: I024e8885c0ed44675d3028a662f386dda811f2ad
Signed-off-by: Brad Fitzpatrick <bradfitz@tailscale.com>
This allows direct use of NLPublic with tka.Authority.KeyTrusted() and
similar without using tricks like converting the return value of Verifier.
Signed-off-by: Adrian Dewhurst <adrian@tailscale.com>
Duplicating this at each layer doesnt make any sense, and is another
invariant where things could go wrong.
Signed-off-by: Tom DNetto <tom@tailscale.com>
* tka.State.staticValidateCheckpoint could call methods on a contained key prior to calling StaticValidate on that key
* Remove broken backoff / RPC retry logic from tka methods in ipn/ipnlocal, to be fixed at a later time
* Fix NetworkLockModify() which would attempt to take b.mu twice and deadlock, remove now-unused dependence on netmap
* Add methods on ipnlocal.LocalBackend to be used in integration tests
* Use TAILSCALE_USE_WIP_CODE as the feature flag so it can be manipulated in tests
Signed-off-by: Tom DNetto <tom@tailscale.com>
The io/ioutil package has been deprecated as of Go 1.16 [1]. This commit
replaces the existing io/ioutil functions with their new definitions in
io and os packages.
Reference: https://golang.org/doc/go1.16#ioutil
Signed-off-by: Eng Zer Jun <engzerjun@gmail.com>
This will be needed to support preauth-keys with network lock in the future,
so getting the core mechanics out of the way now.
Signed-off-by: Tom DNetto <tom@tailscale.com>
Alex Chan
Brad Fitzpatrick
Anton Tolchanov
Joe Tsai
Andrew Lytvynov
Jenny Zhang
Tom DNetto
Ross Zurowski
Andrea Gottardo
valscale
Andrew Dunham
Will Norris
Adrian Dewhurst
Josh Soref
Eng Zer Jun