drive: fix index out of bounds when parsing request local paths (#15517)
Fix the index out of bound panic when a request is made to the local
fileserver mux with a valid secret-token, but missing share name.
Example error:
http: panic serving 127.0.0.1:40974: runtime error: slice bounds out of range [2:1]
Additionally, we document the edge case behavior of utilities that
this fileserver mux depends on.
Signed-off-by: Craig Hesling <craig@hesling.com>
This commit is contained in:
@@ -133,6 +133,71 @@ func TestPermissions(t *testing.T) {
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}
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}
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// TestMissingPaths verifies that the fileserver running at localhost
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// correctly handles paths with missing required components.
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//
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// Expected path format:
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// http://localhost:[PORT]/<secretToken>/<share>[/<subSharePath...>]
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func TestMissingPaths(t *testing.T) {
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s := newSystem(t)
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fileserverAddr := s.addRemote(remote1)
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s.addShare(remote1, share11, drive.PermissionReadWrite)
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client := &http.Client{
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Transport: &http.Transport{DisableKeepAlives: true},
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}
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addr := strings.Split(fileserverAddr, "|")[1]
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secretToken := strings.Split(fileserverAddr, "|")[0]
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testCases := []struct {
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name string
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path string
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wantStatus int
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}{
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{
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name: "empty path",
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path: "",
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wantStatus: http.StatusForbidden,
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},
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{
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name: "single slash",
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path: "/",
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wantStatus: http.StatusForbidden,
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},
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{
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name: "only token",
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path: "/" + secretToken,
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wantStatus: http.StatusBadRequest,
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},
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{
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name: "token with trailing slash",
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path: "/" + secretToken + "/",
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wantStatus: http.StatusBadRequest,
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},
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{
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name: "token and invalid share",
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path: "/" + secretToken + "/nonexistentshare",
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wantStatus: http.StatusNotFound,
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},
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}
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for _, tc := range testCases {
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t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
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u := fmt.Sprintf("http://%s%s", addr, tc.path)
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resp, err := client.Get(u)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("unexpected error making request: %v", err)
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}
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defer resp.Body.Close()
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if resp.StatusCode != tc.wantStatus {
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t.Errorf("got status code %d, want %d", resp.StatusCode, tc.wantStatus)
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}
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})
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}
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}
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// TestSecretTokenAuth verifies that the fileserver running at localhost cannot
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// be accessed directly without the correct secret token. This matters because
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// if a victim can be induced to visit the localhost URL and access a malicious
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@@ -704,8 +769,8 @@ func (a *noopAuthenticator) Close() error {
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return nil
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}
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const lockBody = `<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" ?>
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<D:lockinfo xmlns:D='DAV:'>
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<D:lockscope><D:exclusive/></D:lockscope>
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<D:locktype><D:write/></D:locktype>
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const lockBody = `<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" ?>
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<D:lockinfo xmlns:D='DAV:'>
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<D:lockscope><D:exclusive/></D:lockscope>
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<D:locktype><D:write/></D:locktype>
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</D:lockinfo>`
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