cmd/{containerboot,k8s-operator}: reissue auth keys for broken proxies (#16450)

Adds logic for containerboot to signal that it can't auth, so the
operator can reissue a new auth key. This only applies when running with
a config file and with a kube state store.

If the operator sees reissue_authkey in a state Secret, it will create a
new auth key iff the config has no auth key or its auth key matches the
value of reissue_authkey from the state Secret. This is to ensure we
don't reissue auth keys in a tight loop if the proxy is slow to start or
failing for some other reason. The reissue logic also uses a burstable
rate limiter to ensure there's no way a terminally misconfigured
or buggy operator can automatically generate new auth keys in a tight loop.

Additional implementation details (ChaosInTheCRD):

- Added `ipn.NotifyInitialHealthState` to ipn watcher, to ensure that
  `n.Health` is populated when notify's are returned.
- on auth failure, containerboot:
  - Disconnects from control server
  - Sets reissue_authkey marker in state Secret with the failing key
  - Polls config file for new auth key (10 minute timeout)
  - Restarts after receiving new key to apply it

- modified operator's reissue logic slightly:
  - Deletes old device from tailnet before creating new key
  - Rate limiting: 1 key per 30s with initial burst equal to replica count
  - In-flight tracking (authKeyReissuing map) prevents duplicate API calls
    across reconcile loops

Updates #14080

Change-Id: I6982f8e741932a6891f2f48a2936f7f6a455317f


(cherry picked from commit 969927c47c3d4de05e90f5b26a6d8d931c5ceed4)

Signed-off-by: Tom Proctor <tomhjp@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: chaosinthecrd <tom@tmlabs.co.uk>
This commit is contained in:
Tom Proctor
2026-03-11 10:25:57 +00:00
committed by GitHub
parent 7a43e41a27
commit 95a135ead1
11 changed files with 875 additions and 156 deletions
+8 -6
View File
@@ -1111,7 +1111,7 @@ func tailscaledConfig(stsC *tailscaleSTSConfig, loginUrl string, newAuthkey stri
if newAuthkey != "" {
conf.AuthKey = &newAuthkey
} else if shouldRetainAuthKey(oldSecret) {
} else if !deviceAuthed(oldSecret) {
key, err := authKeyFromSecret(oldSecret)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("error retrieving auth key from Secret: %w", err)
@@ -1164,6 +1164,8 @@ func latestConfigFromSecret(s *corev1.Secret) (*ipn.ConfigVAlpha, error) {
return conf, nil
}
// authKeyFromSecret returns the auth key from the latest config version if
// found, or else nil.
func authKeyFromSecret(s *corev1.Secret) (key *string, err error) {
conf, err := latestConfigFromSecret(s)
if err != nil {
@@ -1180,13 +1182,13 @@ func authKeyFromSecret(s *corev1.Secret) (key *string, err error) {
return key, nil
}
// shouldRetainAuthKey returns true if the state stored in a proxy's state Secret suggests that auth key should be
// retained (because the proxy has not yet successfully authenticated).
func shouldRetainAuthKey(s *corev1.Secret) bool {
// deviceAuthed returns true if the state stored in a proxy's state Secret
// suggests that the proxy has successfully authenticated.
func deviceAuthed(s *corev1.Secret) bool {
if s == nil {
return false // nothing to retain here
return false // No state Secret means no device state.
}
return len(s.Data["device_id"]) == 0 // proxy has not authed yet
return len(s.Data["device_id"]) > 0
}
func shouldAcceptRoutes(pc *tsapi.ProxyClass) bool {