cmd/derper: fix mesh auth for DERP servers (#16061)
To authenticate mesh keys, the DERP servers used a simple == comparison, which is susceptible to a side channel timing attack. By extracting the mesh key for a DERP server, an attacker could DoS it by forcing disconnects using derp.Client.ClosePeer. They could also enumerate the public Wireguard keys, IP addresses and ports for nodes connected to that DERP server. DERP servers configured without mesh keys deny all such requests. This patch also extracts the mesh key logic into key.DERPMesh, to prevent this from happening again. Security bulletin: https://tailscale.com/security-bulletins#ts-2025-003 Fixes tailscale/corp#28720 Signed-off-by: Simon Law <sfllaw@tailscale.com>
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+22
-6
@@ -134,7 +134,7 @@ type Server struct {
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publicKey key.NodePublic
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logf logger.Logf
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memSys0 uint64 // runtime.MemStats.Sys at start (or early-ish)
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meshKey string
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meshKey key.DERPMesh
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limitedLogf logger.Logf
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metaCert []byte // the encoded x509 cert to send after LetsEncrypt cert+intermediate
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dupPolicy dupPolicy
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@@ -464,8 +464,13 @@ func genDroppedCounters() {
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// amongst themselves.
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//
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// It must be called before serving begins.
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func (s *Server) SetMeshKey(v string) {
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s.meshKey = v
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func (s *Server) SetMeshKey(v string) error {
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k, err := key.ParseDERPMesh(v)
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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s.meshKey = k
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return nil
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}
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// SetVerifyClients sets whether this DERP server verifies clients through tailscaled.
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@@ -506,10 +511,10 @@ func (s *Server) SetTCPWriteTimeout(d time.Duration) {
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}
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// HasMeshKey reports whether the server is configured with a mesh key.
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func (s *Server) HasMeshKey() bool { return s.meshKey != "" }
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func (s *Server) HasMeshKey() bool { return !s.meshKey.IsZero() }
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// MeshKey returns the configured mesh key, if any.
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func (s *Server) MeshKey() string { return s.meshKey }
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func (s *Server) MeshKey() key.DERPMesh { return s.meshKey }
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// PrivateKey returns the server's private key.
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func (s *Server) PrivateKey() key.NodePrivate { return s.privateKey }
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@@ -1355,7 +1360,18 @@ func (c *sclient) requestMeshUpdate() {
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// isMeshPeer reports whether the client is a trusted mesh peer
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// node in the DERP region.
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func (s *Server) isMeshPeer(info *clientInfo) bool {
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return info != nil && info.MeshKey != "" && info.MeshKey == s.meshKey
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// Compare mesh keys in constant time to prevent timing attacks.
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// Since mesh keys are a fixed length, we don’t need to be concerned
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// about timing attacks on client mesh keys that are the wrong length.
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// See https://github.com/tailscale/corp/issues/28720
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if info == nil || info.MeshKey == "" {
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return false
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}
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k, err := key.ParseDERPMesh(info.MeshKey)
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if err != nil {
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return false
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}
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return s.meshKey.Equal(k)
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}
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// verifyClient checks whether the client is allowed to connect to the derper,
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