fix: scope apikey export to the caller for non-admins
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A non-admin's forced export filter includes co-resident *user* records so
abode/resident data isn't left with dangling references, but the same `users`
allowlist was also governing `apikey` records — leaking co-residents' apikey
metadata (name/permissions/expiry, though not the secret token).

Add a dedicated `apikeys` uid-allowlist to ExportFilter that scopes apikey
records specifically, falling back to `users` when absent (so existing
unfiltered/voluntary-narrowing behaviour and the round-trip are unchanged).
computeForcedExportFilter now sets it to the caller alone (intersected with an
apikey credential's restrict_users), so a non-admin can only ever export their
own keys. Global admins (forced filter null) are unaffected.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
2026-07-22 23:16:31 +00:00
co-authored by Claude
parent ccb970f200
commit aadc950e24
4 changed files with 49 additions and 10 deletions
+20
View File
@@ -109,6 +109,12 @@ async function seed(db: TestDb["db"]): Promise<Seed> {
permissions: {},
expires_at: null,
});
await db.createApikey({
uid: co.uid,
name: "co key",
permissions: {},
expires_at: null,
});
const note1 = await db.createNote(
{
aid: abode1.aid,
@@ -312,6 +318,9 @@ describe("exportScope: computeForcedExportFilter", () => {
new Set([s.normal.uid, s.co.uid]),
);
assert.ok(!forced!.users!.includes(s.admin.uid));
// apikeys are self-only, even though co is a co-resident whose user
// record is exported for referential integrity.
assert.deepEqual(forced!.apikeys, [s.normal.uid]);
// A caller requesting a wider abode never gets it: intersection, not union.
const effective = intersectExportFilters(
@@ -557,6 +566,17 @@ describe("GET /export endpoint", () => {
assert.ok(userUids.has(s.co.uid));
assert.ok(!userUids.has(s.admin.uid), "admin not a co-resident of aid1");
// apikeys are self-only: the caller's own key is exported, but a
// co-resident's key metadata is NOT, even though their user record is.
const apikeyUids = lines
.filter((l) => l.kind === "apikey")
.map((l) => l.data.uid);
assert.deepEqual(new Set(apikeyUids), new Set([s.normal.uid]));
assert.ok(
!apikeyUids.includes(s.co.uid),
"co-resident apikey metadata must not leak",
);
// The meta line records the *effective* (narrowed) filter.
const meta = lines.find((l) => l.kind === "meta");
assert.ok(meta);