fix: scope apikey export to the caller for non-admins
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A non-admin's forced export filter includes co-resident *user* records so abode/resident data isn't left with dangling references, but the same `users` allowlist was also governing `apikey` records — leaking co-residents' apikey metadata (name/permissions/expiry, though not the secret token). Add a dedicated `apikeys` uid-allowlist to ExportFilter that scopes apikey records specifically, falling back to `users` when absent (so existing unfiltered/voluntary-narrowing behaviour and the round-trip are unchanged). computeForcedExportFilter now sets it to the caller alone (intersected with an apikey credential's restrict_users), so a non-admin can only ever export their own keys. Global admins (forced filter null) are unaffected. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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@@ -9,10 +9,13 @@ import type { ExportFilter } from "../db/types/ExportImport.js";
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* global admin whose credential imposes no narrowing) — their own filter, if
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* any, is then honored verbatim as a voluntary narrowing.
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*
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* Otherwise returns `{ abodes, users }`: the abodes the caller resides in, and
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* the users needed to keep that data referentially whole (the caller plus every
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* co-resident of those abodes). This is the maximum a non-admin may export; the
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* route intersects it with any caller-supplied filter (never a union).
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* Otherwise returns `{ abodes, users, apikeys }`: the abodes the caller resides
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* in, the users needed to keep that data referentially whole (the caller plus
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* every co-resident of those abodes), and — scoped tighter than `users` —
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* apikeys limited to the caller alone, so a non-admin never exports another
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* user's apikey metadata even though that user's record is included. This is
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* the maximum a non-admin may export; the route intersects it with any
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* caller-supplied filter (never a union).
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*/
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export async function computeForcedExportFilter(
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db: BackendDbInterface,
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@@ -40,6 +43,8 @@ export async function computeForcedExportFilter(
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let abodes = [...abodeSet];
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let users = [...userSet];
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// apikeys are self-only for non-admins, regardless of co-residency.
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let apikeys = [user.uid];
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// An apikey can only narrow what its owning user could otherwise export.
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if (session.source === "apikey") {
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@@ -51,8 +56,9 @@ export async function computeForcedExportFilter(
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if (p.restrict_users?.length) {
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const allow = new Set(p.restrict_users);
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users = users.filter((u) => allow.has(u));
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apikeys = apikeys.filter((u) => allow.has(u));
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}
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}
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return { abodes, users };
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return { abodes, users, apikeys };
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}
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